Next President and Putin

What the Next President Must Do About Putin

An open letter from the Pentagon’s former key Russia expert on how to contain Russia’s aggressive autocrat.

By Evelyn Farkas

Madam/Mr. President-to-be-elected, you will enter office facing Vladimir Putin’s Russia as a potential geostrategic threat to the United States. You will need a strategy to counter and resist this threat, which is only growing. At the moment, Putin appears to be closer to prevailing in Syria and holding steady in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. His use of force to protect despots and to render governments hostage to Moscow’s will is working to some extent, as Joint Chiefs Chairman Joseph Dunford tacitly acknowledged last week when he told reporters that because of Russia’s military intervention in Syria, the Assad regime “is in a better place” ahead of scheduled peace talks in Geneva this week. Putin may have helped Assad regain control of enough of Syria to potentially retain power and in Eastern Europe the states with uninvited Russian forces continue to experience limits on their territorial and political sovereignty.

What precisely is the threat from Russia? Putin’s two main objectives—to keep himself in power and to rebuild Russia as a great power—do not in themselves endanger U.S. national interests. The threat lies in the fact that Putin is trying to achieve his goals by rewriting international rules and norms that are critical to U.S. security. Specifically, he seeks to inaugurate a new international order that permits human rights abuses by despotic leaders and invasion, occupation and political subversion of sovereign states. Not to mention assassination: Only last week, a British inquiry led by retired high court judge Robert Owen found that the murder of former FSB agent Alexander Litvinenko in 2006 was “probably” directed by the Russian president.

To permit this behavior to go unchallenged would mean the end of the post-World War II Westphalian, post- Cold War world order, which simultaneously enshrined territorial state sovereignty and human and minority rights. And we certainly can't let Russia weaken or destroy NATO, our most effective operational alliance, and our solidarity with Europe our biggest trading partner.

If Russia wins its aims outright—Ukraine remains ungovernable and territories in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova remain occupied, and Assad remains in power—Putin’s Kremlin will be emboldened to use military force again and again to achieve its foreign (and domestic) policy objectives. Your administration will need to do more with our allies and partners to prevent a resolution to ongoing or “frozen” conflicts that runs counter to the wishes of the people of those countries. This is not to say that we should not compromise in order to put an end to conflict and human suffering (especially in Syria), but we must structure our compromises so that they contain the path to, or at least, the possibility for future exercise of democratic political and territorial sovereignty.

The United States must counter and resist Russia’s actions though a combination of deterrence, strengthening our allies and partners and communicating the truth about the Kremlin’s actions to the international community. Your administration must strive to convince Russia that neo-Soviet adventurism on its periphery will not advance its interests; Russia cannot be allowed to prevail in Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, where its military occupations have led to so-called frozen conflicts that serve as a Russian veto on the policies of those countries. Russia can have influence on those countries, but it should be based on mutual sovereign agreement, not coercion.

This is a propitious moment to shift into a more forward-leaning posture. Despite Moscow’s apparent strength on the world stage, it is dealing from economic weakness. The international sanctions have hurt—last April Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said they had cost Russia $26.7 billion in 2014 and he expected that to rise to $80 billion by the end of 2015. But the real leverage the United States and our allies have is owed to the collapse of oil prices. Over half of Russian government revenues are derived from oil and gas. The Russian government budget for 2016 was predicated on an oil price of $50 per barrel, but the price is now hovering at about $30 a barrel and may fall further. The World Bank estimates that Russian GDP will continue shrinking by 0.7 percent in 2016.

Until now, Russian officials have insisted that the military budget takes priority and will not suffer significant cuts. But if Russia keeps up its military operations in Syria, Ukraine and elsewhere, the accumulating costs may provide ammunition to Russian economists and other officials who are wary of, if not opposed to, the new Russian military adventurism. And if the economic situation worsens for the average Russian due to inflation and the falling value of the ruble, resource realities could, over time, rein in Russian military operations and lead Russia to a more accommodating policy. Former Russian Economic Minister Alexei Kudrin recently reminded Russians that the cost of supporting Crimea and the separatists in eastern Ukraine are far greater than military operations in Syria; these costs include infrastructure, and social support and are estimated to run into billions of dollars.

What must we do now? On the diplomatic front, the United States must be present and actively engaged in the Eastern European and Central Asian states on Russia’s periphery. We must also remain engaged in NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and with the European Union, as well as bilaterally with our European allies. We must provide assistance combating corruption and strengthening the rule of law and civil society. Your administration should work to highlight Russia’s poor compliance with conventional and nuclear arms control agreements and work with the international community to bring Russia into compliance and/or raise the costs of their violations. We must work more with allies outside of Europe—specifically with Japan, South Korea, Israel, Australia and others to highlight Russia’s illegal and destructive actions and policies to the larger international community and to push back against Russia’s international agenda in the United Nations and elsewhere. Included in this effort should be engagement with China to persuade Beijing where possible to help defend the status quo, fight corruption and limit Russia’s military adventurism. At the same time, realistically, China is currently more likely to take heart from and emulate Russia’s success at drawing new international boundaries and seizing new territory. That is all the more reason for us to build an international coalition against such actions.

This doesn’t mean we don’t talk to Russia at all—we need to keep the lines of communication open to minimize miscalculation and to explore possible areas of cooperation. And since the most dangerous aspect of our relationship are the nuclear forces we have arrayed against one another, we must continue to talk about how to reduce those forces and ensure a strategy stability that discourages either side from reckless use of nuclear or conventional force. Having said that, we can’t set aside Russia’s transgressions in Europe—Moscow must pay a diplomatic price; it should be called out in international fora and held accountable.

On Ukraine in particular, we should acknowledge the shared achievements of Ukrainians, Americans (especially Ambassador Geoff Pyatt, Assistant Secretary Toria Nuland and Deputy Secretary Tony Blinken) and Europeans in keeping Ukraine viable, and helping it progress politically, economically and militarily. This was no small feat. Your administration must now double down with the international community to press Russia to withdraw Russian forces from eastern Ukraine and Crimea and restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity. This means implementing the Minsk agreements, which grant greater autonomy to the Russian-backed separatist regions of eastern Ukraine in exchange for Russian withdrawal. It means isolating Russia on Crimea and seeking accountability from Moscow for its violation of the Budapest Memorandum—which offered political assurances to Ukraine regarding territorial sovereignty in exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons—and its subsequent threats to place nuclear weapons in Crimea, which would be a double violation of that agreement. We should also actively seek Russian accountability for the 2014 MH-17 tragedy, where Russian separatists fatally shot down a commercial airliner carrying 298 people.

International diplomacy must be coupled with and strengthened by positive and negative economic and military measures. You must push for implementation of the trade agreements negotiated by your predecessor President Obama—a the Trans-Pacific Partnership and U.S.-E.U. Free Trade Agreement. The United States must also provide greater economic, trade and investment assistance to Ukraine and the other vulnerable Russian neighbors who have opted to seek association with the European Union.

Simultaneously, you must work hard to maintain the broad U.S. and European sanctions on Russia related to Ukraine, while continuing narrow sanctions aimed at Russia’s defense sector until Russian troops redeploy from Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova (all countries where they are present without the consent of the sovereign governments). Your defense department should no longer do any business with Russia. This means that no rockets used by the U.S. defense industry should be Russian—nor should Russian scientists be involved in our rocket launches. And your administration should establish a new foreign military assistance fund to help allies and partners throughout Europe and Afghanistan transition from Russian to U.S. military equipment. Finally, you must work with Germany and other allies to meet Europe’s natural gas demand in way that gives them leverage against Moscow, not the other way around, and benefits U.S companies and alternative suppliers.

On the military front, you must do more to deter Russia from further military action. You will need to build on the Obama administration’s good work so far through the European Reassurance Initiative to establish a true deterrent to Russian military action against NATO. That means continuing to position equipment for training or contingency operations in the vulnerable Baltic and Balkan countries and Poland, and again, actively helping allies break their dependence on Russian military hardware. And it means recognizing that Russia violated the principles of the NATO-Russia Framework Agreement by invading Georgia and Ukraine. Therefore, NATO is now free to position substantial military forces in the eastern part of NATO territory, and should consider placing a battalion or more in Poland.

Finally, continuing to bring stability to the Balkans will require standing up to Russia. Your predecessor did it on the issue of extending NATO membership to Montenegro. At a time when the United States has much to celebrate after 20 years of post-Dayton peace in the former Yugoslavia, Russia is working to undermine stability and the integration of the Yugoslav successor states into NATO and the European Union. EU and U.S. diplomats together must strengthen the Bosnian state through political reform, and put a halt to Serb separatism fostered by Russia. And as soon as Kosovo has constitutionally mandated armed forces, NATO should include that state into its Partnership for Peace program.

On the non-NATO periphery, your administration should beef up security assistance to Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova to defend their territory. The military assistance provided from 2014 to the end of 2015—over $260 million, well over $40 million and over $30 million in equipment and training to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, respectively—has much improved those militaries. Future assistance should expand the current territorial defense training for Ukraine to cover a greater portion of their armed forces and this model should be applied to Georgia and Moldova. We must push for faster NATO implementation of the assistance package Georgia received at the NATO summit last year. Our European partners should work with us on training in territorial defense for Georgia, distinct from the counterterrorism training we provide before Georgians deploy with us—as the second largest troop contributor—to Afghanistan. We should provide all three countries with anti-tank weapons, so that they can have a chance to deter the larger, more ready Russian forces.

And across the Caucasus and Central Asia we should advance our interest in energy diversity for Europe, counterterrorism cooperation and an open land and air supply route to and from Afghanistan. We must continue to offer those countries, an alternative partner to Russia in countering terrorism, one that won’t seek to diminish state sovereignty. We must finish our work in Afghanistan so that that country is never again a haven for terrorism against the United States, but also so that Kabul can withstand ill-intentioned outside interference, including from Russia. Finally, if we could devise a snap solution to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, which would freeze Russia out, this master stroke would give Armenia the option to regain its full sovereignty and catch up economically with its neighbors.

On the unconventional front, you should authorize and fund the Special Operations Command and its components to work with NATO and partner countries so Putin’s “little green men” are thwarted. Allied ability to deter, prevent and respond to Russian cyber operations must be improved and we must protect U.S. military assets and edge in space. In the nuclear realm, if Russia cannot be brought into compliance with the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, your administration, regrettably, has to be prepared to deploy intermediate forces to NATO territory in Europe to ensure effective an nuclear deterrence just as we did in the 1980s.

Your administration must also work proactively to put out accurate information on Russian policy and actions and also improve current efforts to counter Russian propaganda. We need a dedicated team like the one being established as the new State Department Global Engagement Center to counter radical Islamic terrorists’ messages. Such a Russia-focused team should be supported by an intelligence cell tasked with pushing declassified and reclassified intelligence to share with the public, allies and partners. And our cyber expertise should be applied to exposing Russian so-called trolls and generally foiling Russian message campaigns.

If you succeed in taking the actions described above in conjunction with our allies and partners worldwide it will become apparent to Putin that he cannot achieve his international objectives—controlling the countries on Russia’s periphery and rewriting the international rules. Russia will be forced to reconsider its approach. Then, perhaps, the pent-up and misguided human resources of the Russian people can be directed toward a future that is economically, politically and culturally better for all citizens of the Russian Federation and Russians beyond its borders. And you will have successfully managed what is currently the greatest potential geostrategic threat to U.S. national security interests.