Made Modern Europe?

How George H.W. Bush Made Modern Europe

Germany, above all, was lucky to have this American president in power in 1989.

By JOHN KORNBLUM

uch has been written about the role of luck in history and politics. Without doubt, the Western world and perhaps the entire globe can count themselves to have been blessed with good fortune when George H.W. Bush was elected U.S. president in 1988.

“41” rode into office on the coattails of Ronald Reagan’s lofty visions for an America reborn, in a notoriously nasty campaign. Bush admitted that he was not so good at “that vision thing,” as he himself called it. And, as was brutally clear after his loss to Bill Clinton in 1992, he never really caught on with voters at home.

But his values, background and training prepared him in particular for the major international challenges which were approaching. And he also made history, not with vision, rather almost by instinct. Bush translated Reagan’s visions into a series of historic achievements that are still guiding events in the Western world, China and the Middle East. He was the first and perhaps the last president who had trained for the position. And he believed in his calling. As Bush often noted: “There is nothing more fulfilling than to serve your country and your fellow citizens and to do it well.”

Bush even turned the vice presidency into a training camp. “You die, we fly,” became the VP’s unofficial motto as he was deputized to represent the president at a series of state funerals during his eight years under Reagan, including three in the Soviet Union. These events were solemn, but they were also human. The networks of contacts built by a vice president always willing to take on a new mission served Bush and his country well in the dramatic days which lay ahead.

By chance, this trustworthy, ”professional” president assumed office just as the postwar world was beginning to come apart. Europe and the Middle East. Russia and China all presented major challenges. Bush not only understood diplomacy, he reveled in it. Time and again, leaders from that era recall that it was George Bush’s personal contacts and his skill in using them which made success possible.

Bush’s empathy with foreign leaders was central to his success. This was especially true in a chapter in which I played a supporting role, the end of the Cold War. By 1989, the rapid economic collapse of the Soviet bloc was evident to all who wished to see it. But Europe and the world were so unprepared for the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 that it came as a shock to most everyone.

Inside accounts of Soviet reactions tell us that Moscow was left dazed and immobilized by the events. Western Europeans, including the British and French, made clear that they would rather it had not happened. Even President Bush’s first reaction was diffident. When asked about his lack of enthusiasm, Bush retreated to his famous reticence by noting “I’m just not an emotional sort of guy.”

But emotions were high. François Mitterrand traveled to East Germany to see if reunification could be blocked. Maggie Thatcher ordered a review of options to halt the reemergence of a unified Germany. Opinions in Washington varied. Some in the State Department and NSC were skeptical.

One person was convinced that the moment must be seized. That was Helmut Kohl in Bonn. He knew how fragile it would be. On November 8, the eve of the Wall opening, Kohl had been in Warsaw and had followed the cautious official line by telling Polish leaders than they had nothing to fear. It would be many generations before Germany would be reunited. Privately, signs of a growing Soviet counter-reaction pushed Kohl into action. The results were Kohl’s 10 points setting forth a strategy for reunification.

Whatever doubts some in Washington may have harbored, Bush seemed immediately to understand what was going on. In later years, Kohl stressed to me personally several times how central the support of Bush and his team had been to gaining acceptance for German reunification.

An important step on the road to reunification of Germany was the “seasick summit” Bush held with Gorbachev on a Soviet ship off the coast of stormy Malta on December 2-3, 1989. On December 4, Bush came directly to NATO, where I was deputy American representative. I was asked to comment on what was to become the definitive statement on German reunification. Later that day, the president read the statement at a press conference at NATO headquarters. Key points included the condition that the future of Germany must be decided by the free expression of will by the German people and, the key point, a reunited Germany must be free to choose its alliances.

This short statement essentially defined the future of Europe. By calling for self-determination in Germany, Bush made clear that there would be no big power meddling in the future of the reunified nation. And by calling for a free choice of alliances, the president laid down a marker — no neutrality for a reunified Germany.

The ensuing negotiations were essentially controlled by an American team under Secretary of State James Baker. The so-called “two plus four” talks unified the two German states under the authority which the four World War II victorious powers had maintained since 1945, thus making a peace treaty with 50 nations unnecessary. Baker’s approach mirrored that of his boss — firm but cooperative. Gorbachev was treated with full respect. In a private discussion several years later, Gorbachev stressed to me how important this sign of respect had been for him in maintaining support for the process in Moscow.

I experienced German affection for President Bush a few years later as American ambassador to Germany. Chancellor Kohl had invited the ex-President to the annual celebration of reunification, held that year in Stuttgart. The crowds were so large and enthusiastic that Kohl’s security lost control and we had to be rushed out of the event. Later that evening, President Bush spoke for less than 15 minutes in his special modest way and gave credit to the German people themselves for reunification.

However important the European chapter was, we should not forget that preparations for the first Gulf War were also proceeding at exactly the same time. Secretary Baker created a textbook example how an international coalition can maintain support for a difficult operation. Neglect of this task by George W. Bush led to the disasters of the Iraq War.

These lessons seem to be out of date in today’s America. But the continuing validity of many of the partnerships forged in 1989 by George H.W. Bush demonstrates that American can be great only by respecting its partners and allies.