Our Resolve

Putin Is Testing Our Resolve

A former senior Pentagon adviser says recent Russian incursions into NATO airspace are evidence of the Kremlin’s growing aggressiveness.

By  Evelyn Farkas

f the Turkish military shoot-down of a Russian SU-24 fighter aircraft is a “stab in the back,” as President Vladimir Putin characterized it on Tuesday, then the knife wound came after some very loud footsteps from behind and shouts of “Here I come!” Following recent Russian incursions into Turkish airspace, in other words, no one should be surprised.

On October 3 and 4, Russian fighter jets first veered into Turkish airspace. Both incursions were met with sharp warnings from Ankara, as well as from NATO headquarters and Washington. In one official explanation, the Russian military blamed weather conditions—which an Internet search demonstrated were excellent. And Tuesday, according to the Turkish government, the Russian pilots were warned 10 times before their plane was dispatched to the ground.

We may never learn definitively whether the pilots strayed into Turkish airspace accidentally or whether this incursion was a test of Turkish and NATO resolve. But considering Putin’s past behavior, we should go on the assumption that it is the latter.

In the end, it is Russia that is wielding the knife here—shredding international law and conventions that have held firm for decades. The hard cold truth is that the sum of Russia’s agenda, not just in Syria but globally, runs counter to the values and interests of the United States, its allies and partners. Russia’s challenge is so fundamental to the international system, to democracy and free market capitalism that we cannot allow the Kremlin’s policy to succeed in Syria or elsewhere.

As regrettable as it is to go back, in a sense, to a Cold War-type confrontation, it will be increasingly difficult not to do so as long as Russia continues on its current course. As a former senior State Department official said to me recently, “The only thing worse than bilateral escalation is unilateral escalation.” If we fail to counter Russia’s actions, deterring and responding to Russia will become more difficult over time and we will be forced to do so having already lost the initiative. For this reason, even while the coalition expresses genuine interest in cooperating with Russia to fight ISIL, Turkey’s shoot-down of the Russian SU-24 makes sense.

The problem we in the West have, apart from ISIL, is Russia. While we must do everything to avoid miscalculation or conflict with the Russia, we must demonstrate resolve on small probes or even what may be accidental air incursions. If we don’t do so, in an excess of caution, the result could well be that we only embolden Russia. Let’s keep the stakes low.

The confrontation between Turkey and Russia comes at a time when Putin is already testing transatlantic unity over Syria policy by attempting to forge a new coalition with France to respond to the ISIL attacks specifically on Paris and on the Russian Metrojet airliner over the Sinai. It remains to be seen what action Putin may take to retaliate against Turkey for the downing of the aircraft. There are potential targets; the two countries have strong trade and economic ties, with Turkey providing a major tourist destination for Russians and Russia providing over half of Turkey’s natural gas. But relations were already soured because of the fundamental difference between Russia and the U.S.-led coalition’s policy toward Syria.

In Syria, Russia’s main objective—despite occasional official comments indicating that Moscow is not wedded to Bashar Assad per se, or to his staying in power indefinitely—is to keep Assad in power. The one indicator of this intent is Russian military action; the fact is, Russian airstrikes have mainly targeted Syrian opposition forces, not ISIL. Meanwhile, try as Putin might to fracture coalition or NATO unity, the United States, Turkey and France are adamant that the dictator who used chemical weapons and barrel bombs against his citizens be removed.

So even if Russia starts targeting ISIL increasingly as part of bilateral cooperation with France or an arrangement with the U.S.-led coalition, we’ll still have a big gap in overall objectives, as President Barack Obama made clear at his news conference with French President François Hollande on Tuesday. "We've got a coalition: 65 countries," Obama said. "Russia right now is a coalition of two: Iran and Russia supporting Assad." The world and the Syrian people are crying for a political compromise, but an arrangement acceptable to Russia and the coalition, as well as Syrian opposition leaders, Saudi Arabia and Iran, is not in sight.

The chief obstacle, again, is Russia.

Russia’s objectives in Syria are driven by Putin’s overall political objectives. Those include: 1) Retaining his position as the leader of the Russian Federation and preserving the autocratic political system and mafia-style crony economy that together comprise “Putinism”; 2) restoring Russia’s status as a great power, prospering economically and militarily and capable of not only balancing but checking U.S. and Western power; 3) rewriting the international rules and norms to prevent interventions in sovereign affairs of states to protect its citizens; 4) maintaining political control of Russia’s geographical periphery (Europe/Eurasia and Central Asia) to ensure economic access and to provide a geopolitical buffer zone against purported NATO encirclement; and 5) breaking NATO, the European Union and transatlantic unity.

To achieve these objectives, Russia has invaded neighboring countries, occupied their territory, and funded NGOs and political parties not only in its periphery but also in NATO countries. It has exerted economic pressure through its near monopoly of oil and gas supply and through its corrupt ties with elites worldwide. And it has used lies and propaganda to influence ethnic Russian populations and the international community and to confuse policy debates. In Syria, as in Ukraine, military force is being used to set the diplomatic table; much as Slobodan Milosevic did in the 1990s during the war in Bosnia, the map created by the fighting will determine the new baselines for negotiations.

While the United States and its allies intervene to try to save Syria’s citizens from further abuse from their dictator, the Russian government intervenes to save the ruthless leader. True, we can forge a temporary alliance with Russia against ISIL, and we should. Retribution should rain down, and ISIL should be eliminated. This is one important element of any Syrian settlement. But let’s not lose sight of the fact that Assad can never be regarded as a legitimate leader again.

Meanwhile, Russia is not finished in Ukraine; its military equipment and forces in Ukraine and over the border can and may be moved into renewed action. It is not finished in Georgia or Moldova, and if Belarus continues to resist the new base Moscow wants to build there, what will happen next? Kremlin officials are making noises about Afghanistan and putting pressure on the Central Asian states. Putin likes to surprise his opponents and keep them off balance. If Russia’s Syria intervention stalls, the temptation to strike again elsewhere will be that much greater.

So we must look up from Syria and beyond Syria and forge a consistent policy that prioritizes political, economic and military assistance to allies and partners globally in the face of Russian pressure. Senior U.S. officials must be present in the vulnerable Russian periphery—as Secretary of State John Kerry was recently (in Central Asia). And diplomats must focus again on the former Yugoslavia, where Russia is attempting to take advantage of existing political tensions to undermine the existing central governments and integration with NATO and the EU. In the NATO context, we must continue to build our ability to deter Russia militarily, and we must provide assistance to allies to break their dependence on Russian military hardware. The Defense Department should also continue to provide training for territorial defense to Ukraine, but also to Georgia and Moldova. Defensive lethal assistance (mainly anti-tank weapons) should be provided to those countries so they have a chance at deterring the larger, more ready Russian forces. We must also devise additional economic means to pressure Russia. We cannot take for granted the low oil prices that have fortuitously assisted us so far. At some point, the price of oil will increase.

If the MH-17 tragedy in 2014, where Russian separatists shot down a commercial airliner, didn’t demonstrate the fact that Russia’s challenge is international, Moscow’s actions in Syria have. We must continue to work with the international community—non-transatlantic allies and partners, including Japan, Israel, Australia and Malaysia, among others—to hold Russia accountable for the MH-17 crash, the violation of the Budapest memorandum, which offered political assurances to Ukraine in exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons, and for failing to implement the Minsk agreements in Ukraine. Finally, Russia must answer for its violations of and poor compliance with arms control agreements—first and foremost the INF Treaty—and come into compliance or face consequences.

We need to steel ourselves and outmaneuver Moscow so that U.S. national security interests and objectives prevail.