Russian bombers, advisers arrive in Iraq to aid in fight against ISIS
The battle for Saddam Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit stretched into a third day Sunday with both the Iraqi government and Islamist insurgents reporting heavy loss as five jet fighters Iraq purchased from Russia arrived.
The head of Iraq’s nascent air force said the jets would soon enter the fight to push back the forces of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria that have seized much of central and northern Iraq in the past three weeks.
“In the coming three or four days the aircraft will be in service to support our forces in the fight” against ISIS and other Sunni rebels, said Gen. Anwar Hama Ameen, the commander of the Iraqi Air Force in a Baghdad briefing.
The fight in Tikrit represents the first major effort by the Iraqi government to reclaim territory lost to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in a surprise takeover of much of central and northern Iraq that began June 10 in Mosul and quickly spread throughout the country. Thousands of Iraqi Army forces backed by Shiite militias are now trying to to battle up Iraq’s main central highway to enter Tikrit, a city of 200,000 that fell to ISIS and its Sunni Muslim tribal allies on June 11.
Both sides claimed the momentum, and there was little independent information on which to judge the likely outcome.
The Iraqi government insisted the operation in Tikrit was going according to plan, while militants and tribal leaders claimed that the government’s main advance from the nearby town of Samarra had bogged down as it encountered roadside bombs the insurgents have planted over the last two weeks.
"The security forces are advancing from different areas" around Tikrit, Lt. Gen. Qassem Atta told reporters in Baghdad. "There are ongoing clashes."
Twitter accounts associated with ISIS claimed that several hundred government troops had been killed and a dozen tanks and armored vehicles destroyed in the battle, but both sides commonly exaggerate both progress and casualties inflicted and neither account could be confirmed.
The handful of residents who have remained in Tikrit _ as much as 70 percent of the town’s population reportedly has fled the government advance _ told local television there was little sign of government forces in the city center but described a number of helicopter attacks that use rudimentary barrel bombs to flatten large parts of the city center ahead of the government advance.
With both sides claiming momentum in the fight, the arrival from Russia of five Su-25 fighter bombers late Saturday night with two more expected to arrive on Sunday could provide an important boost to both Iraqi Army morale and firepower. Twelve Russian technical advisers also arrived with the shipment.
Iraqi news media called the arrival of the Russian equipment _ U.S. F16s are not expected until September _ a warning to the Obama administration over its reluctance to grant an Iraqi government request to begin air strikes against the insurgents. Iraq has virtually no air force and until the arrival of the Russian planes, no jet fighter aircraft in the country.
The quick Russian delivery also underscores the complexity of the Iraqi developments, where the United States finds itself allied with Russia and Iran fighting to preserve Iraq’s central government even as the three countries are on the opposite side of the civil war in Syria, where ISIS is also fighting to topple the government of Syrian President Bashar Assad.
Embattled Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, whose departure from power has become almost a condition for U.S. support, signed a $500 million deal with Russia for the delivery of at least 12 fighter bombers.
Iran and Iraq have also discussed returning as many as 20 aircraft that Saddam’s regime flew to Iran for safety before the 1991 Gulf War with the United States and other allies after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Iran later refused to return the outdated jet fighters, claiming they were reparations for Iraq’s aggression in the 1980 to 1989 Iran-Iraq war.
Substantial questions about the effectiveness of such aircraft remain after 23 years out of service.
The United States has said it will send as many as 300 U.S. advisers to assist the Iraqis and is flying as many as 35 reconnaissance flights over the country daily. Iran also has provided advisers to the Iraqi government and is reported to be flying drones over the country, while the Syrian air force also reportedly has struck ISIS positions inside Iraq.
How the various efforts will be coordinated is uncertain. The Pentagon has said it will not coordinate with Iran.
A place were I can write...
My simple blog of pictures of travel, friends, activities and the Universe we live in as we go slowly around the Sun.
June 30, 2014
Blackwater
Before Shooting in Iraq, a Warning on Blackwater
By JAMES RISEN
Just weeks before Blackwater guards fatally shot 17 civilians at Baghdad’s Nisour Square in 2007, the State Department began investigating the security contractor’s operations in Iraq. But the inquiry was abandoned after Blackwater’s top manager there issued a threat: “that he could kill” the government’s chief investigator and “no one could or would do anything about it as we were in Iraq,” according to department reports.
American Embassy officials in Baghdad sided with Blackwater rather than the State Department investigators as a dispute over the probe escalated in August 2007, the previously undisclosed documents show. The officials told the investigators that they had disrupted the embassy’s relationship with the security contractor and ordered them to leave the country, according to the reports.
After returning to Washington, the chief investigator wrote a scathing report to State Department officials documenting misconduct by Blackwater employees and warning that lax oversight of the company, which had a contract worth more than $1 billion to protect American diplomats, had created “an environment full of liability and negligence.”
“The management structures in place to manage and monitor our contracts in Iraq have become subservient to the contractors themselves,” the investigator, Jean C. Richter, wrote in an Aug. 31, 2007, memo to State Department officials. “Blackwater contractors saw themselves as above the law,” he said, adding that the “hands off” management resulted in a situation in which “the contractors, instead of Department officials, are in command and in control.”
His memo and other newly disclosed State Department documents make clear that the department was alerted to serious problems involving Blackwater and its government overseers before the Nisour Square shooting, which outraged Iraqis and deepened resentment over the United States’ presence in the country.
Today, as conflict rages again in Iraq, four Blackwater guards involved in the Nisour Square shooting are on trial in Washington on charges stemming from the episode, the government’s second attempt to prosecute the case in an American court after previous charges against five guards were dismissed in 2009.
The shooting was a watershed moment in the American occupation of Iraq, and was a factor in Iraq’s refusal the next year to agree to a treaty allowing United States troops to stay in the country beyond 2011. Despite a series of investigations in the wake of Nisour Square, the back story of what happened with Blackwater and the embassy in Baghdad before the fateful shooting has never been fully told.
The State Department declined to comment on the aborted investigation. A spokesman for Erik Prince, the founder and former chief executive of Blackwater, who sold the company in 2010, said Mr. Prince had never been told about the matter.
After Mr. Prince sold the company, the new owners named it Academi. In early June, it merged with Triple Canopy, one of its rivals for government and commercial contracts to provide private security. The new firm is called Constellis Holdings Experts who were previously unaware of this episode said it fit into a larger pattern of behavior. “The Blackwater-State Department relationship gave new meaning to the word ‘dysfunctional,’ ” said Peter Singer, a strategist at the New America Foundation, a public policy institute, who has written extensively on private security contractors. “It involved everything from catastrophic failures of supervision to shortchanging broader national security goals at the expense of short-term desires.”
Even before Nisour Square, Blackwater’s security guards had acquired a reputation among Iraqis and American military personnel for swagger and recklessness, but their complaints about practices ranging from running cars off the road to shooting wildly in the streets and even killing civilians typically did not result in serious action by the United States or the Iraqi government.
But scrutiny of the company intensified after a Blackwater convoy traveling through Nisour Square on Sept. 16, 2007, just over two weeks after Mr. Richter sent his memo, fired on the crowded traffic circle. A 9-year-old boy was among the civilians killed. Blackwater guards later claimed that they had been fired upon first, but American military officials who inspected the scene determined that there was no evidence of any insurgent activity in the square that day. Federal prosecutors later said Blackwater personnel had shot indiscriminately with automatic weapons, heavy machine guns and grenade launchers.
Founded in 1997 by Mr. Prince, a former member of the Navy SEALs and an heir to an auto parts fortune, Blackwater began as a small company providing shooting ranges and training facilities in rural North Carolina for the military and for police departments. After the American-led invasion of Afghanistan and later Iraq, it ramped up to become a global security contractor with billions of dollars in contracts for the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.
The company’s gung-ho attitude and willingness to take on risky tasks were seductive to government officials in Washington. The State Department, for example, secretly sent Blackwater guards to Shenyang, China, to provide security for North Korean asylum seekers who had gone to the United States Consulate there and refused to leave for fear the Chinese government would force them to go back to North Korea, according to company documents and interviews with former Blackwater personnel.
But Blackwater’s rapid growth and the State Department’s growing dependence on the contractor led to unbridled hubris, according to several former company officials. That was fostered, they said, by Mr. Prince, who not long before the Nisour Square shooting gathered employees in front of Blackwater headquarters in Moyock, N.C., and demanded that they swear an oath of allegiance.
Saying that the business was on the verge of being awarded lucrative new contracts, Mr. Prince told the workers that they had to take a pledge — the same one required of those entering the United States military — “to display our commitment to the war on terror,” several former employees recalled.
As he was speaking, the employees were handed copies of the oath, which had a Blackwater bear paw logo on top, and told to sign and return it to their supervisors after reciting the words. But some balked.
a private company, and many in the crowd were veterans who believed that it was inappropriately being linked to the company’s commercial prospects.
“It was kind of like pledging allegiance to Erik,” said a former Blackwater employee, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he had been required to sign a nondisclosure agreement with Blackwater. “That’s how a lot of us interpreted it.”
It did not take long for the two-man investigative team — Mr. Richter, a Diplomatic Security special agent, and Donald Thomas Jr., a State Department management analyst — to discover a long list of contract violations by Blackwater.
They found that Blackwater’s staffing of its security details for American diplomats had been changed without State Department approval, reducing guards on many details to eight from 10, the documents said. Blackwater guards were storing automatic weapons and ammunition in their private rooms, where they also were drinking heavily and partying with frequent female visitors. Many of the guards had failed to regularly qualify on their weapons, and were often carrying weapons on which they had never been certified and that they were not authorized to use.
The armored vehicles Blackwater used to protect American diplomats were poorly maintained and deteriorating, and the investigators found that four drunk guards had commandeered one heavily armored, $180,000 vehicle to drive to a private party, and crashed into a concrete barrier.
Blackwater was also overbilling the State Department by manipulating its personnel records, using guards assigned to the State Department contract for other work and falsifying other staffing data on the contract, the investigators concluded.
The investigators concluded that Blackwater was getting away with such conduct because embassy personnel had gotten too close to the contractor.
On Aug. 20, 2007, Mr. Richter was called in to the office of the embassy’s regional security officer, Bob Hanni, who said he had received a call asking him to document Mr. Richter’s “inappropriate behavior.” Mr. Richter quickly called his supervisor in Washington, who instructed him to take Mr. Thomas with him to all remaining meetings in Baghdad, his report noted.
The next day, the two men met with Daniel Carroll, Blackwater’s project manager in Iraq, to discuss the investigation, including a complaint over food quality and sanitary conditions at a cafeteria in Blackwater’s compound. Mr. Carroll barked that Mr. Richter could not tell him what to do about his cafeteria, Mr. Richter’s report said. The Blackwater official went on to threaten the agent and say he would not face any consequences, according to Mr. Richter’s later account.
Mr. Carroll said “that he could kill me at that very moment and no one could or would do anything about it as we were in Iraq,” Mr. Richter wrote in a memo to senior State Department officials in Washington. He noted that Mr. Carroll had formerly served with Navy SEAL Team 6, an elite unit.
“Mr. Carroll’s statement was made in a low, even tone of voice, his head was slightly lowered; his eyes were fixed on mine,” Mr. Richter stated in his memo. “I took Mr. Carroll’s threat seriously. We were in a combat zone where things can happen quite unexpectedly, especially when issues involve potentially negative impacts on a lucrative security contract.”
He added that he was especially alarmed because Mr. Carroll was Blackwater’s leader in Iraq, and “organizations take on the attitudes and mannerisms of their leader.”
Mr. Thomas witnessed the exchange and corroborated Mr. Richter’s version of events in a separate statement, writing that Mr. Carroll’s comments were “unprofessional and threatening in nature.” He added that others in Baghdad had told the two investigators to be “very careful,” considering that their review could jeopardize job security for Blackwater personnel.
Mr. Richter was shocked when embassy officials sided with Mr. Carroll and ordered Mr. Richter and Mr. Thomas to leave Iraq immediately, according to the documents. On Aug. 23, Ricardo Colon, the acting regional security officer at the embassy, wrote in an email that Mr. Richter and Mr. Thomas had become “unsustainably disruptive to day-to-day operations and created an unnecessarily hostile environment for a number of contract personnel.” The two men cut short their inquiry and returned to Washington the next day.
Mr. Richter and Mr. Thomas declined to comment for this article. Mr. Carroll did not respond to a request for comment.
On Oct. 5, 2007, just as the State Department and Blackwater were being rocked by scandal in the aftermath of Nisour Square, State Department officials finally responded to Mr. Richter’s August warning about Blackwater. They took statements from Mr. Richter and Mr. Thomas about their accusations of a threat by Mr. Carroll, but took no further action.
Condoleezza Rice, then the secretary of state, named a special panel to examine the Nisour Square episode and recommend reforms, but the panel never interviewed Mr. Richter or Mr. Thomas.
Patrick Kennedy, the State Department official who led the special panel, told reporters on Oct. 23, 2007, that the panel had not found any communications from the embassy in Baghdad before the Nisour Square shooting that raised concerns about contractor conduct.
Lawrence of Arabia
Bill Moyers Essay: What We Can Learn From Lawrence of Arabia
You may remember the scene when, after dynamiting the Hijaz railway and looting a Turkish supply train, Lawrence is asked by an American reporter, “What, in your opinion, do these people hope to gain from this war?”
“They hope to gain their freedom,” Lawrence replies, and when the journalist scoffs, insists, “They’re going to get it. I’m going to give it to them.”
At war’s end, Lawrence’s vision of Arab independence was shattered when the Versailles peace conference confirmed the carving of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine into British and French spheres of influence; arbitrary boundaries drawn in the sand to satisfy the appetites of empire – Britain’s Foreign Office even called the former Ottoman lands “The Great Loot.”
The hopeful Lawrence drew his own “peace map” of the region, one that paid closer heed to tribal allegiances and rivalries. The map could have saved the world a lot of time, trouble and treasure, one historian said, providing the region “with a far better starting point than the crude imperial carve up.” Lawrence wrote to a British major in Cairo: “I’m afraid you will be delayed a long time, cleaning up all the messes and oddments we have left behind us.”
Since 2003, as the reckless invasion of Iraq unfolded, demand for Lawrence’s book, “Seven Pillars of Wisdom” increased eightfold. It was taught at the Pentagon and Sandhurst — Britain’s West Point — for its insights into fighting war in the Middle East. In 2010, Major Niel Smith, who had served as operations officer for the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center, told The Christian Science Monitor, “T.E. Lawrence has in some ways become the patron saint of the US Army advisory effort in Afghanistan and Iraq.”
But then and now, Lawrence’s understanding of the ancient and potent jealousies of the people among whom he had lived and fought generally was ignored. In 1920, he wrote for the Times of London an unsettling and prophetic article about Iraq – then under the thumb of the British. He decried the money spent, the number of troops and loss of life, and warned that his countrymen had been led “into a trap from which it will be hard to escape with dignity and honor. They have been tricked into it by a steady withholding of information…. Things have been far worse than we have been told, our administration more bloody and inefficient than the public knows. It… may soon be too inflamed for any ordinary cure. We are today not far from a disaster.”
Not for the last time in the Middle East would disaster come from the blundering ignorance and blinding arrogance of foreign intruders convinced by magical thinking of their own omnipotence and righteousness. How soon we forget. How often we repeat.
by Bill Moyers and Michael Winship
As fears grow of a widening war across the Middle East, fed by reports that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) envisions a region-wide, all controlling theocracy, we found ourselves talking about another war. The Great War – or World War I, as it would come to be called — was triggered one hundred years ago this month when an assassin shot and killed Austria’s Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo. Through a series of tangled alliances and a cascade of misunderstandings and blunders, that single act of violence brought on a bloody catastrophe. More than 37 million people were killed or wounded.
In America, if we reflect on World War I at all, we think mostly about the battlefields and trenches of Europe and tend to forget another front in that war — against the Ottoman Empire of the Turks that dominated the Middle East. A British Army officer named T.E. Lawrence became a hero in the Arab world when he led nomadic Bedouin tribes in battle against Turkish rule. Peter O’Toole immortalized him in the epic movie, “Lawrence of Arabia.”
You may remember the scene when, after dynamiting the Hijaz railway and looting a Turkish supply train, Lawrence is asked by an American reporter, “What, in your opinion, do these people hope to gain from this war?”
“They hope to gain their freedom,” Lawrence replies, and when the journalist scoffs, insists, “They’re going to get it. I’m going to give it to them.”
At war’s end, Lawrence’s vision of Arab independence was shattered when the Versailles peace conference confirmed the carving of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine into British and French spheres of influence; arbitrary boundaries drawn in the sand to satisfy the appetites of empire – Britain’s Foreign Office even called the former Ottoman lands “The Great Loot.”
The hopeful Lawrence drew his own “peace map” of the region, one that paid closer heed to tribal allegiances and rivalries. The map could have saved the world a lot of time, trouble and treasure, one historian said, providing the region “with a far better starting point than the crude imperial carve up.” Lawrence wrote to a British major in Cairo: “I’m afraid you will be delayed a long time, cleaning up all the messes and oddments we have left behind us.”
Since 2003, as the reckless invasion of Iraq unfolded, demand for Lawrence’s book, “Seven Pillars of Wisdom” increased eightfold. It was taught at the Pentagon and Sandhurst — Britain’s West Point — for its insights into fighting war in the Middle East. In 2010, Major Niel Smith, who had served as operations officer for the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center, told The Christian Science Monitor, “T.E. Lawrence has in some ways become the patron saint of the US Army advisory effort in Afghanistan and Iraq.”
But then and now, Lawrence’s understanding of the ancient and potent jealousies of the people among whom he had lived and fought generally was ignored. In 1920, he wrote for the Times of London an unsettling and prophetic article about Iraq – then under the thumb of the British. He decried the money spent, the number of troops and loss of life, and warned that his countrymen had been led “into a trap from which it will be hard to escape with dignity and honor. They have been tricked into it by a steady withholding of information…. Things have been far worse than we have been told, our administration more bloody and inefficient than the public knows. It… may soon be too inflamed for any ordinary cure. We are today not far from a disaster.”
Not for the last time in the Middle East would disaster come from the blundering ignorance and blinding arrogance of foreign intruders convinced by magical thinking of their own omnipotence and righteousness. How soon we forget. How often we repeat.
Lies
The Lies We Believed (And Still Believe) About Iraq
Facts are and must be the coin of the realm in a democracy, for government “of the people, by the people, and for the people,” in Abraham Lincoln’s words, requires an informed citizenry. But in regard to the Iraq War, it seems, facts are now irrelevant or at least debatable, a mere matter of opinion, for a majority of Americans. And if facts no longer matter to millions of our fellow citizens, then what becomes of the traditional role of the journalist as the independent watchdog digging through obfuscation, secrecy and deception by the powerful in search of what Carl Bernstein once called “the best obtainable version of the truth”?
This is a question that touches me personally — not just as a concerned citizen, but as someone who has dedicated his life and work to the pursuit of truth. In more than three decades as an investigative reporter in Washington, DC, my approach toward those in power, regardless of party or ideology, has followed the principle “Watch what they do, not what they say.”
So as a professional truth-seeker, I have always been skeptical of statements by those in power, preferring to ignore the official versions of events in my quest for the (sometimes ugly) underlying realities. That quest continues. But when I learned the extent to which the public had swallowed and accepted the official lies about WMDs in Iraq, I realized that I actually could no longer ignore what those in power had said. Their shameless manipulations and mis-representations, I now saw, were a crucial element in the tragedy of that dubious war of choice, and therefore deserving of investigation and analysis in their own right. Precisely what had US government officials said to cause most Americans and their elected representatives to completely ignore facts, logic, and reason in the rush to war? Exactly who was involved and to what extent?
I began systematically to investigate the answers to those and other related questions, enlisting the help of a team of reporters, researchers and other contributors that ultimately included 25 people. Nearly three years later, the Center for Public Integrity published Iraq: The War Card, a 380,000-word report with an online searchable database. It was released on the eve of the five-year anniversary of the invasion of Iraq and was covered extensively by the national and international news media.
Our report found that in the two years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush and seven of his administration’s top officials made at least 935 false statements about the national security threat posed by Iraq. The carefully orchestrated campaign of untruths about Iraq’s alleged threat to US national security from its WMDs or links to al Qaeda (also specious) galvanized public opinion and led the nation to war under decidedly false pretenses. Perhaps most revealing: the number of false statements made by top Bush administration officials dramatically increased from August 2002 to the time of the critical October 2002 congressional approval of the war resolution and spiked even higher between January and March 2003, between Secretary of State Colin Powell’s address before the United Nations General Assembly and the fateful March 19, 2003, invasion.
The so-called Coalition of the Willing was a face-saving artifice cobbled together after the UN Security Council failed to approve the US-instigated invasion, rendering it a violation of the UN Charter and thus “illegal.” Furthermore, “the intelligence” referred to by Perino proved to be anything but intelligent; indeed, it had been mostly manufactured by the administration in accordance with its political agenda.
Three months after the Center for Public Integrity Iraq report, David Barstow of The New York Times reported more details about how the Iraq deception had been orchestrated. Barstow revealed that the Pentagon had quietly recruited and coached 75 retired military officers to be “independent” paid consultants and radio and television analysts whose true role was to make the case for war in Iraq. Many had significant, undisclosed financial ties to defense companies and were thus benefiting hugely from the very policies they were “analyzing.”
Earlier, Barstow had reported (with colleague Robin Stein) that “at least 20 federal agencies, including the Defense Department and the Census Bureau, have made and distributed hundreds of television news segments between 2001 and 2005 . . . Many were subsequently broadcast on local stations across the country without any acknowledgement of the government’s role in their production.” David Walker, the then comptroller general of the Government Accountability Office, who happened to be a Republican, declared that such taxpayer-paid propaganda by the government is unethical and violates federal law. However, the Bush administration publicly disagreed, and Congress meekly declined to pursue the matter any further.
And a month after the stunning Times stories, one of the White House officials who had actually made several false statements in the lead-up to the Iraq invasion, former press secretary Scott McClellan, wrote a “surprisingly scathing” memoir admitting that his own public comments at White House briefings about Iraq had been “badly misguided,” that President Bush had not been “open and forthright on Iraq,” and that instead he had relied on “propaganda.”
But in the context of the overall performance of the media, these valiant efforts to get beyond the official version to uncover the truth about our involvement in Iraq were too little, too late. The full extent of deference to power and self-censorship by our obsequious major news media during the run-up to war is still not fully known; it will gradually seep out — or not — over the coming years. Some major news organizations later grudgingly acknowledged that their coverage was insufficiently critical of government pronouncements. But that did nothing to ameliorate the tragic consequences of an unnecessary war, including a financial toll of more than $2 trillion, a sum that is likely to increase substantially with benefits to war veterans over time and other expenses, as well as — far more important — the deaths of thousands upon thousands of soldiers and innocent civilians, including women and children.
Did President Bush and other officials from his administration lie about Iraq intentionally and deliberately? It’s hard to tell without unfettered access to the principals and their internal communications. Certainly, we should never underestimate the human capacity for self-delusion — too often, we find it easy to believe what we want to believe. But the fact is that they have avoided the glare of formal scrutiny about their personal responsibility for the litany of repeated, false statements in the run-up to war. Under the Republicans in 2005 and 2006, and the Democrats in 2007 and 2008, there was no congressional investigation into this specific question. Congressional oversight focused almost entirely on the quality of the US government’s pre-war intelligence — not the veracity of the highest-ranking US officials’ public statements or the objectivity and logic of their decision making in instigating the war. Nor in 2009 did the new Democratic president Barack Obama, his administration, or the Democratic Congress evince any interest in investigating this politically sensitive subject. There may be no more telling example of what has happened to congressional oversight in Washington in recent decades.
by Charles Lewis
At the end of 2004, a series of public opinion polls offered disturbing news. More than half of all Americans, we learned, believed that there had been weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq — the principal raison d’ĂȘtre for George W. Bush’s war of choice there — despite the fact that numerous widely publicized bipartisan and international reports had definitively shown that no such weapons existed. This stubborn refusal to face the facts about Iraq continues today for millions of Americans.
This is a question that touches me personally — not just as a concerned citizen, but as someone who has dedicated his life and work to the pursuit of truth. In more than three decades as an investigative reporter in Washington, DC, my approach toward those in power, regardless of party or ideology, has followed the principle “Watch what they do, not what they say.”
Politicians, captains of industry, and their zealous aides too often resemble circus barkers, shilling for attention and advantage, with little regard for accuracy or veracity, using the press and the news media not to enlighten but to bamboozle the public in pursuit of votes, profits and power. When necessary, they even employ the wiles of deception to conceal, disguise, or justify unseemly and sometimes outright criminal behavior. As George Orwell wrote, in words that still ring true more than half a century after they were written, “Political speech and writing are largely the defence [sic] of the indefensible . . . Political language . . . is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.”
I began systematically to investigate the answers to those and other related questions, enlisting the help of a team of reporters, researchers and other contributors that ultimately included 25 people. Nearly three years later, the Center for Public Integrity published Iraq: The War Card, a 380,000-word report with an online searchable database. It was released on the eve of the five-year anniversary of the invasion of Iraq and was covered extensively by the national and international news media.
Our report found that in the two years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush and seven of his administration’s top officials made at least 935 false statements about the national security threat posed by Iraq. The carefully orchestrated campaign of untruths about Iraq’s alleged threat to US national security from its WMDs or links to al Qaeda (also specious) galvanized public opinion and led the nation to war under decidedly false pretenses. Perhaps most revealing: the number of false statements made by top Bush administration officials dramatically increased from August 2002 to the time of the critical October 2002 congressional approval of the war resolution and spiked even higher between January and March 2003, between Secretary of State Colin Powell’s address before the United Nations General Assembly and the fateful March 19, 2003, invasion.
Within hours of the release of our report, White House press secretary Dana Perino responded with scorn: “I hardly think that the study is worth spending any time on. It is so flawed in terms of taking anything into context or including — they only looked at members of the administration rather than looking at members of Congress or people around the world. Because as you’ll remember, we were part of a broad coalition of countries that deposed a dictator based on a collective understanding of the intelligence.” This sophistry was at least consistent with the administration’s track record of distorting reality. In fact, neither Congress nor America’s international allies was demanding an invasion of Iraq before the administration started beating the war drums.
Three months after the Center for Public Integrity Iraq report, David Barstow of The New York Times reported more details about how the Iraq deception had been orchestrated. Barstow revealed that the Pentagon had quietly recruited and coached 75 retired military officers to be “independent” paid consultants and radio and television analysts whose true role was to make the case for war in Iraq. Many had significant, undisclosed financial ties to defense companies and were thus benefiting hugely from the very policies they were “analyzing.”
Earlier, Barstow had reported (with colleague Robin Stein) that “at least 20 federal agencies, including the Defense Department and the Census Bureau, have made and distributed hundreds of television news segments between 2001 and 2005 . . . Many were subsequently broadcast on local stations across the country without any acknowledgement of the government’s role in their production.” David Walker, the then comptroller general of the Government Accountability Office, who happened to be a Republican, declared that such taxpayer-paid propaganda by the government is unethical and violates federal law. However, the Bush administration publicly disagreed, and Congress meekly declined to pursue the matter any further.
The broadcast and cable news media, which had overwhelmingly failed to investigate or challenge the administration’s flawed case for war, shamelessly ignored Barstow’s revelations, neither reporting on their own dubious use of such compromised news sources nor apologizing to the public for the resulting gross misrepresentations of fact.
There were a few honorable exceptions in Washington to the general failure of the news media to challenge the pro-war deceptions. They included the fine independent coverage by then Knight Ridder (now McClatchy) Washington bureau reporters Warren Strobel and Jonathan Landay; the prescient articles by Walter Pincus, buried in the back pages by his nervous Washington Post editors; and, in early 2004, the Abu Ghraib prison-abuse scandal stories by CBS News 60 Minutes II and Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker. Later, in 2005, beyond the Iraq deceptions, there were Dana Priest’s exposĂ©s in The Washington Post about the Central Intelligence Agency’s secret “black site” prisons and James Risen and Eric Lichtblau’s stories in The New York Times revealing how the Bush administration had quietly authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to secretly eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United States, without warrants usually required for domestic surveillance.
Could the Iraq War have been prevented if the public had been better informed before the invasion about the specious official statements, faulty logic, and breathtaking manipulations of public opinion and governmental decision-making processes? I believe the answer to that grim question is very possibly yes, and it will haunt me and others in my profession for years to come.
Investigating this tale of dishonesty by those in power and acquiescence on the part of those charged with reporting the truth has been a disheartening experience for me. Even more sobering, however, is the fact that the Iraq War deception, with its 935 public, shameless lies, is simply the latest and most egregious story of truth betrayed that I’ve witnessed or reported on over the past five decades. My career in journalism has coincided with a tragic period in American history — one in which falsehood has increasingly come to dominate our public discourse, and in which the bedrock values of honesty, transparency, accountability and integrity we once took for granted have been steadily eroded.
First Iraq War Was a Pack of Lies
The First Iraq War Was Also Sold to the Public Based on a Pack of Lies
by Joshua Holland
Polls suggest that Americans tend to differentiate between our “good war” in Iraq — “Operation Desert Storm,” launched by George HW Bush in 1990 — and the “mistake” his son made in 2003.
Across the ideological spectrum, there’s broad agreement that the first Gulf War was “worth fighting.” The opposite is true of the 2003 invasion, and a big reason for those divergent views was captured in a 2013 CNN poll that found that “a majority of Americans (54%) say that prior to the start of the war the administration of George W. Bush deliberately misled the U.S. public about whether Baghdad had weapons of mass destruction.”
But as the usual suspects come out of the woodwork to urge the US to once again commit troops to Iraq, it’s important to recall that the first Gulf War was sold to the public on a pack of lies that were just as egregious as those told by the second Bush administration 12 years later.
The Lie of an Expansionist Iraq
Most countries condemned Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. But the truth — that it was the culmination of a series of tangled economic and historical conflicts between two Arab oil states — wasn’t likely to sell the US public on the idea of sending our troops halfway around the world to do something about it.
So we were given a variation of the “domino theory.” Saddam Hussein, we were told, had designs on the entire Middle East. If he wasn’t halted in Kuwait, his troops would just keep going into other countries.
As Scott Peterson reported for The Christian Science Monitor in 2002, a key part of the first Bush administration’s case “was that an Iraqi juggernaut was also threatening to roll into Saudi Arabia. Citing top-secret satellite images, Pentagon officials estimated in mid-September [of 1990] that up to 250,000 Iraqi troops and 1,500 tanks stood on the border, threatening the key US oil supplier.”
A quarter of a million troops with heavy armor amassed on the Saudi border certainly seemed like a clear sign of hostile intent. In announcing that he had deployed troops to the Gulf in August 1990, George HW Bush said, “I took this action to assist the Saudi Arabian Government in the defense of its homeland.” He asked the American people for their “support in a decision I’ve made to stand up for what’s right and condemn what’s wrong, all in the cause of peace.”
But one reporter — Jean Heller of the St. Petersburg Times — wasn’t satisfied taking the administration’s claims at face value. She obtained two commercial satellite images of the area taken at the exact same time that American intelligence supposedly had found Saddam’s huge and menacing army and found nothing there but empty desert.
She contacted the office of then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney “for evidence refuting the Times photos or analysis offering to hold the story if proven wrong.” But “the official response” was: “Trust us.”
Heller later told the Monitor’s Scott Peterson that the Iraqi buildup on the border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia “was the whole justification for Bush sending troops in there, and it just didn’t exist.”
Dead Babies, Courtesy of a New York PR Firm
Military occupations are always brutal, and Iraq’s six-month occupation of Kuwait was no exception. But because Americans didn’t have an abundance of affection for Kuwait, a case had to be built that the Iraqi army was guilty of nothing less than Nazi-level atrocities.
That’s where a hearing held by the Congressional Human Rights Caucus in October 1990 played a major role in making the case for war.
A young woman who gave only her first name, Nayira, testified that she had been a volunteer at Kuwait’s al-Adan hospital, where she had seen Iraqi troops rip scores of babies out of incubators, leaving them “to die on the cold floor.” Between tears, she described the incident as “horrifying.”
Her account was a bombshell. Portions of her testimony were aired that evening on ABC’s “Nightline” and NBC’s “Nightly News.” Seven US senators cited her testimony in speeches urging Americans to support the war, and George HW Bush repeated the story on 10 separate occasions in the weeks that followed.
In 2002, Tom Regan wrote about his own family’s response to the story for The Christian Science Monitor:
In 1992, John MacArthur revealed in The New York Times that Nayirah was in fact the daughter of Saud Nasir al-Sabah, Kuwait’s ambassador to the US. Her testimony had been organized by a group called Citizens for a Free Kuwait, which was a front for the Kuwaiti government.
Tom Regan reported that Citizens for a Free Kuwait hired Hill & Knowlton, a New York-based PR firm that had previously spun for the tobacco industry and a number of governments with ugly human rights records. The company was paid “$10.7 million to devise a campaign to win American support for the war.” It was a natural fit, wrote Regan. “Craig Fuller, the firm’s president and COO, had been then-President George Bush’s chief of staff when the senior Bush had served as vice president under Ronald Reagan.”
According to Robin Andersen’s A Century of Media, a Century of War, Hill & Knowlton had spent $1 million on focus groups to determine how to get the American public behind the war, and found that focusing on “atrocities” was the most effective way to rally support for rescuing Kuwait.
Arthur Rowse reported for the Columbia Journalism Review that Hill & Knowlton sent out a video news release featuring Nayirah’s gripping testimony to 700 American television stations.
As Tom Regan noted, without the atrocities, the idea of committing American blood and treasure to save Kuwait just “wasn’t an easy sell.”
Saddam Was Irrational
Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait was just as illegal as the US invasion that would ultimately oust him 13 years later — it was neither an act of self-defense, nor did the UN Security Council authorize it.
But it can be argued that Iraq had significantly more justification for its attack.
Kuwait had been a close ally of Iraq, and a top financier of the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980, which, as The New York Times reported, occurred after “Iran’s revolutionary government tried to assassinate Iraqi officials, conducted repeated border raids and tried to topple Mr. Hussein by fomenting unrest within Iraq.”
Saddam Hussein felt that Kuwait should forgive part of his regime’s war debt because he had halted the “expansionist plans of Iranian interests” not only on behalf of his own country, but in defense of the other Gulf Arab states as well.
After an oil glut knocked out about two-thirds of the value of a barrel of crude oil between 1980 and 1986, Iraq appealed to OPEC to limit crude oil production in order to raise prices — with oil as low as $10 per barrel, the government was struggling to pay its debts. But Kuwait not only resisted those efforts — and asked OPEC to increase its quotas by 50 percent instead — for much of the 1980s it also had maintained its own production well above OPEC’s mandatory quota. According to a study by energy economist Mamdouh Salameh, “between 1985 and 1989, Iraq lost US$14 billion a year due to Kuwait’s oil price strategy,” and “Kuwait’s refusal to decrease its oil production was viewed by Iraq as an act of aggression against it.”
There were additional disputes between the two countries centering on Kuwait’s exploitation of the Rumaila oil fields, which straddled the border between the two countries. Kuwait was accused of using a technique known as “slant-drilling” to siphon off oil from the Iraqi side.
None of this justifies Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. But a longstanding and complex dispute between two undemocratic petrostates wasn’t likely to inspire Americans to accept the loss of their sons and daughters in a distant fight.
So instead, George HW Bush told the public that Iraq’s invasion was “without provocation or warning,” and that “there is no justification whatsoever for this outrageous and brutal act of aggression.” He added: “Given the Iraqi government’s history of aggression against its own citizens as well as its neighbors, to assume Iraq will not attack again would be unwise and unrealistic.”
Ultimately, these longstanding disputes between Iraq and Kuwait got considerably less attention in the American media than did tales of Kuwaiti babies being ripped out of incubators by Saddam’s stormtroopers.
Saddam Was “Unstoppable”
A crucial diplomatic error on the part of the first Bush administration left Saddam Hussein with the impression that the US government had little interest in Iraq’s conflict with Kuwait. But that didn’t fit into the narrative that the Iraqi dictator was an irrational maniac bent on regional domination. So there was a concerted effort to deny that the US government had ever had a chance to deter his aggression through diplomatic means — and even to paint those who said otherwise as conspiracy theorists.
As John Mearsheimer from the University of Chicago and Harvard’s Stephen Walt wrote in 2003, “Saddam reportedly decided on war sometime in July 1990, but before sending his army into Kuwait, he approached the United States to find out how it would react.”
There is no dispute about one crucially important point: Saddam Hussein consulted with the US before invading, and our ambassador chose not to draw a line in the sand, or even hint that the invasion might be grounds for the US to go to war.
The most generous interpretation is that each side badly misjudged the other. Hussein ordered the attack on Kuwait confident that the US would only issue verbal condemnations. As for Glaspie, she later told The New York Times, ”Obviously, I didn’t think — and nobody else did — that the Iraqis were going to take all of Kuwait.”
Fool Me Once…
The first Gulf War was sold on a mountain of war propaganda. It took a campaign worthy of George Orwell to convince Americans that our erstwhile ally Saddam Hussein — whom the US had aided in his war with Iran as late as 1988 — had become an irrational monster by 1990.
Twelve years later, the second invasion of Iraq was premised on Hussein’s supposed cooperation with al Qaeda, vials of anthrax, Nigerian yellowcake and claims that Iraq had missiles poised to strike British territory in little as 45 minutes.
Now, eleven years later, as Bill Moyers put it last week, “the very same armchair warriors in Washington who from the safety of their Beltway bunkers called for invading Baghdad, are demanding once again that America plunge into the sectarian wars of the Middle East.” It’s vital that we keep our history in Iraq in mind, and apply some healthy skepticism to the claims they offer us this time around.
Across the ideological spectrum, there’s broad agreement that the first Gulf War was “worth fighting.” The opposite is true of the 2003 invasion, and a big reason for those divergent views was captured in a 2013 CNN poll that found that “a majority of Americans (54%) say that prior to the start of the war the administration of George W. Bush deliberately misled the U.S. public about whether Baghdad had weapons of mass destruction.”
But as the usual suspects come out of the woodwork to urge the US to once again commit troops to Iraq, it’s important to recall that the first Gulf War was sold to the public on a pack of lies that were just as egregious as those told by the second Bush administration 12 years later.
The Lie of an Expansionist Iraq
Most countries condemned Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. But the truth — that it was the culmination of a series of tangled economic and historical conflicts between two Arab oil states — wasn’t likely to sell the US public on the idea of sending our troops halfway around the world to do something about it.
So we were given a variation of the “domino theory.” Saddam Hussein, we were told, had designs on the entire Middle East. If he wasn’t halted in Kuwait, his troops would just keep going into other countries.
As Scott Peterson reported for The Christian Science Monitor in 2002, a key part of the first Bush administration’s case “was that an Iraqi juggernaut was also threatening to roll into Saudi Arabia. Citing top-secret satellite images, Pentagon officials estimated in mid-September [of 1990] that up to 250,000 Iraqi troops and 1,500 tanks stood on the border, threatening the key US oil supplier.”
A quarter of a million troops with heavy armor amassed on the Saudi border certainly seemed like a clear sign of hostile intent. In announcing that he had deployed troops to the Gulf in August 1990, George HW Bush said, “I took this action to assist the Saudi Arabian Government in the defense of its homeland.” He asked the American people for their “support in a decision I’ve made to stand up for what’s right and condemn what’s wrong, all in the cause of peace.”
But one reporter — Jean Heller of the St. Petersburg Times — wasn’t satisfied taking the administration’s claims at face value. She obtained two commercial satellite images of the area taken at the exact same time that American intelligence supposedly had found Saddam’s huge and menacing army and found nothing there but empty desert.
She contacted the office of then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney “for evidence refuting the Times photos or analysis offering to hold the story if proven wrong.” But “the official response” was: “Trust us.”
Heller later told the Monitor’s Scott Peterson that the Iraqi buildup on the border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia “was the whole justification for Bush sending troops in there, and it just didn’t exist.”
Dead Babies, Courtesy of a New York PR Firm
Military occupations are always brutal, and Iraq’s six-month occupation of Kuwait was no exception. But because Americans didn’t have an abundance of affection for Kuwait, a case had to be built that the Iraqi army was guilty of nothing less than Nazi-level atrocities.
That’s where a hearing held by the Congressional Human Rights Caucus in October 1990 played a major role in making the case for war.
A young woman who gave only her first name, Nayira, testified that she had been a volunteer at Kuwait’s al-Adan hospital, where she had seen Iraqi troops rip scores of babies out of incubators, leaving them “to die on the cold floor.” Between tears, she described the incident as “horrifying.”
Her account was a bombshell. Portions of her testimony were aired that evening on ABC’s “Nightline” and NBC’s “Nightly News.” Seven US senators cited her testimony in speeches urging Americans to support the war, and George HW Bush repeated the story on 10 separate occasions in the weeks that followed.
In 2002, Tom Regan wrote about his own family’s response to the story for The Christian Science Monitor:
I can still recall my brother Sean’s face. It was bright red. Furious. Not one given to fits of temper, Sean was in an uproar. He was a father, and he had just heard that Iraqi soldiers had taken scores of babies out of incubators in Kuwait City and left them to die. The Iraqis had shipped the incubators back to Baghdad. A pacifist by nature, my brother was not in a peaceful mood that day. “We’ve got to go and get Saddam Hussein. Now,” he said passionately.Subsequent investigations by Amnesty International, a division of Human Rights Watch and independent journalists would show that the story was entirely bogus — a crucial piece of war propaganda the American media swallowed hook, line and sinker. Iraqi troops had looted Kuwaiti hospitals, but the gruesome image of babies dying on the floor was a fabrication.
In 1992, John MacArthur revealed in The New York Times that Nayirah was in fact the daughter of Saud Nasir al-Sabah, Kuwait’s ambassador to the US. Her testimony had been organized by a group called Citizens for a Free Kuwait, which was a front for the Kuwaiti government.
Tom Regan reported that Citizens for a Free Kuwait hired Hill & Knowlton, a New York-based PR firm that had previously spun for the tobacco industry and a number of governments with ugly human rights records. The company was paid “$10.7 million to devise a campaign to win American support for the war.” It was a natural fit, wrote Regan. “Craig Fuller, the firm’s president and COO, had been then-President George Bush’s chief of staff when the senior Bush had served as vice president under Ronald Reagan.”
According to Robin Andersen’s A Century of Media, a Century of War, Hill & Knowlton had spent $1 million on focus groups to determine how to get the American public behind the war, and found that focusing on “atrocities” was the most effective way to rally support for rescuing Kuwait.
Arthur Rowse reported for the Columbia Journalism Review that Hill & Knowlton sent out a video news release featuring Nayirah’s gripping testimony to 700 American television stations.
As Tom Regan noted, without the atrocities, the idea of committing American blood and treasure to save Kuwait just “wasn’t an easy sell.”
Only a few weeks before the invasion, Amnesty International accused the Kuwaiti government of jailing dozens of dissidents and torturing them without trial. In an effort to spruce up the Kuwait image, the company organized Kuwait Information Day on 20 college campuses, a national day of prayer for Kuwait, distributed thousands of “Free Kuwait” bumper stickers, and other similar traditional PR ventures. But none of it was working very well. American public support remained lukewarm the first two months.That would change as stories about Saddam’s baby-killing troops were splashed across front pages across the country.
Saddam Was Irrational
Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait was just as illegal as the US invasion that would ultimately oust him 13 years later — it was neither an act of self-defense, nor did the UN Security Council authorize it.
But it can be argued that Iraq had significantly more justification for its attack.
Kuwait had been a close ally of Iraq, and a top financier of the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980, which, as The New York Times reported, occurred after “Iran’s revolutionary government tried to assassinate Iraqi officials, conducted repeated border raids and tried to topple Mr. Hussein by fomenting unrest within Iraq.”
Saddam Hussein felt that Kuwait should forgive part of his regime’s war debt because he had halted the “expansionist plans of Iranian interests” not only on behalf of his own country, but in defense of the other Gulf Arab states as well.
After an oil glut knocked out about two-thirds of the value of a barrel of crude oil between 1980 and 1986, Iraq appealed to OPEC to limit crude oil production in order to raise prices — with oil as low as $10 per barrel, the government was struggling to pay its debts. But Kuwait not only resisted those efforts — and asked OPEC to increase its quotas by 50 percent instead — for much of the 1980s it also had maintained its own production well above OPEC’s mandatory quota. According to a study by energy economist Mamdouh Salameh, “between 1985 and 1989, Iraq lost US$14 billion a year due to Kuwait’s oil price strategy,” and “Kuwait’s refusal to decrease its oil production was viewed by Iraq as an act of aggression against it.”
There were additional disputes between the two countries centering on Kuwait’s exploitation of the Rumaila oil fields, which straddled the border between the two countries. Kuwait was accused of using a technique known as “slant-drilling” to siphon off oil from the Iraqi side.
None of this justifies Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. But a longstanding and complex dispute between two undemocratic petrostates wasn’t likely to inspire Americans to accept the loss of their sons and daughters in a distant fight.
So instead, George HW Bush told the public that Iraq’s invasion was “without provocation or warning,” and that “there is no justification whatsoever for this outrageous and brutal act of aggression.” He added: “Given the Iraqi government’s history of aggression against its own citizens as well as its neighbors, to assume Iraq will not attack again would be unwise and unrealistic.”
Ultimately, these longstanding disputes between Iraq and Kuwait got considerably less attention in the American media than did tales of Kuwaiti babies being ripped out of incubators by Saddam’s stormtroopers.
Saddam Was “Unstoppable”
A crucial diplomatic error on the part of the first Bush administration left Saddam Hussein with the impression that the US government had little interest in Iraq’s conflict with Kuwait. But that didn’t fit into the narrative that the Iraqi dictator was an irrational maniac bent on regional domination. So there was a concerted effort to deny that the US government had ever had a chance to deter his aggression through diplomatic means — and even to paint those who said otherwise as conspiracy theorists.
As John Mearsheimer from the University of Chicago and Harvard’s Stephen Walt wrote in 2003, “Saddam reportedly decided on war sometime in July 1990, but before sending his army into Kuwait, he approached the United States to find out how it would react.”
In a now famous interview with the Iraqi leader, U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie told Saddam, “[W]e have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.” The U.S. State Department had earlier told Saddam that Washington had “no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait.” The United States may not have intended to give Iraq a green light, but that is effectively what it did.Exactly what was said during the meeting has been a source of some controversy. Accounts differ. According to a transcript released by the Iraqi government, Glaspie told Hussein, ” I admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country.”
I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.
I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during the late 60′s. The instruction we had during this period was that we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction.Leslie Gelb of The New York Times reported that Glaspie told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the transcript was inaccurate “and insisted she had been tough.” But that account was contradicted when diplomatic cables between Baghdad and Washington were released. As Gelb described it, “The State Department instructed Ms. Glaspie to give the Iraqis a conciliatory message punctuated with a few indirect but significant warnings,” but “Ms. Glaspie apparently omitted the warnings and simply slobbered all over Saddam in their meeting on July 25, while the Iraqi dictator threatened Kuwait anew.”
There is no dispute about one crucially important point: Saddam Hussein consulted with the US before invading, and our ambassador chose not to draw a line in the sand, or even hint that the invasion might be grounds for the US to go to war.
The most generous interpretation is that each side badly misjudged the other. Hussein ordered the attack on Kuwait confident that the US would only issue verbal condemnations. As for Glaspie, she later told The New York Times, ”Obviously, I didn’t think — and nobody else did — that the Iraqis were going to take all of Kuwait.”
Fool Me Once…
The first Gulf War was sold on a mountain of war propaganda. It took a campaign worthy of George Orwell to convince Americans that our erstwhile ally Saddam Hussein — whom the US had aided in his war with Iran as late as 1988 — had become an irrational monster by 1990.
Twelve years later, the second invasion of Iraq was premised on Hussein’s supposed cooperation with al Qaeda, vials of anthrax, Nigerian yellowcake and claims that Iraq had missiles poised to strike British territory in little as 45 minutes.
Now, eleven years later, as Bill Moyers put it last week, “the very same armchair warriors in Washington who from the safety of their Beltway bunkers called for invading Baghdad, are demanding once again that America plunge into the sectarian wars of the Middle East.” It’s vital that we keep our history in Iraq in mind, and apply some healthy skepticism to the claims they offer us this time around.
10 Big Fat Lies
10 Big Fat Lies and the Liars Who Told Them
Investigative journalist Chuck Lewis joins Bill this week to discuss his new book, 935 Lies: The Future of Truth and the Decline of America’s Moral Integrity, that looks at the history of government officials and media pundits speaking and repeating (and repeating and repeating) untruths to shape public opinion and policy.
The title of the book refers to the number of times President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and other top administration officials made false statements in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. But the book has a far greater scope, looking at how lies have shaped American policy over several decades.
Here are 10 notable whoppers that affected hundreds, thousands, and in some cases, millions of lives.
1. President Barack Obama on health insurance plans
If you like the [health care] plan you have, you can keep it.”
–President Barack Obama, June 6, 2009 (similarly stated numerous times)
The Affordable Care Act imposed new standards on health care plans, such as a minimum required set of benefits, and limits on total out-of-pocket expenses. A small percentage of existing plans did not meet these standards, and in some cases, the insurance company that had offered them decided to discontinue them. They were, in effect, “canceled.” Though these plans were not very comprehensive, a fraction of the 4-to-5 percent of Americans who had purchased them were upset when they discovered they would not be able to keep them after all. The president’s oft-repeated — and now demonstrably false — claim added fuel to the fire. The administration imposed a temporary “keep your plan” fix to the health care law, and extended it through the midterm elections.
2. President George W. Bush on weapons of mass destruction
The Affordable Care Act imposed new standards on health care plans, such as a minimum required set of benefits, and limits on total out-of-pocket expenses. A small percentage of existing plans did not meet these standards, and in some cases, the insurance company that had offered them decided to discontinue them. They were, in effect, “canceled.” Though these plans were not very comprehensive, a fraction of the 4-to-5 percent of Americans who had purchased them were upset when they discovered they would not be able to keep them after all. The president’s oft-repeated — and now demonstrably false — claim added fuel to the fire. The administration imposed a temporary “keep your plan” fix to the health care law, and extended it through the midterm elections.
2. President George W. Bush on weapons of mass destruction
“We found the weapons of mass destruction [in Iraq]. We found biological laboratories.”
–President George W. Bush, May 29, 2003
In the run-up to the 2003 US-led coalition invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration offered up many reasons for invading and removing Saddam Hussein from power, but WMDs was the foremost one. The false claim was the primary argument for a war and occupation that claimed the lives of about 5,000 coalition soldiers and nearly a half a million Iraqis.
In April 2005, the CIA closed its investigation into weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, finding nothing.
3. Vice President Dick Cheney on weapons of mass destruction
–President George W. Bush, May 29, 2003
In the run-up to the 2003 US-led coalition invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration offered up many reasons for invading and removing Saddam Hussein from power, but WMDs was the foremost one. The false claim was the primary argument for a war and occupation that claimed the lives of about 5,000 coalition soldiers and nearly a half a million Iraqis.
In April 2005, the CIA closed its investigation into weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, finding nothing.
3. Vice President Dick Cheney on weapons of mass destruction
“Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us.”
–Vice President Dick Cheney, August 26, 2002
Dick Cheney made much of the weapons of mass destruction claim as well as other false statements while he was vice president. And he remains convinced that invading Iraq was justified; last year he told a reporter that even if the US only succeeded in eliminating the potential of WMDs in Iraq, it was worth the war effort.
4. R.J. Reynolds on the health hazards of cigarettes
–Vice President Dick Cheney, August 26, 2002
Dick Cheney made much of the weapons of mass destruction claim as well as other false statements while he was vice president. And he remains convinced that invading Iraq was justified; last year he told a reporter that even if the US only succeeded in eliminating the potential of WMDs in Iraq, it was worth the war effort.
4. R.J. Reynolds on the health hazards of cigarettes
“Cigarette smoking is no more ‘addictive’ than coffee, tea or Twinkies.”
–James W. Johnston, CEO of RJR Nabisco, April 14, 1994
For over half a century, American cigarette manufacturers denied that their products were addictive and dangerous, and suppressed their own research that confirmed it. The quote comes from written testimony submitted in a 1994 congressional hearing during which executives from the seven largest tobacco companies admitted that there “may be” some health risks to smoking, but denied that cigarettes were addictive, and that they manipulated nicotine levels to make them more so.
A court order compels tobacco companies to apologize in a series of advertisements that will appear in major newspapers and other media if their appeals are rejected.
5. President Ronald Reagan on the Iran-Contra scandal
–James W. Johnston, CEO of RJR Nabisco, April 14, 1994
For over half a century, American cigarette manufacturers denied that their products were addictive and dangerous, and suppressed their own research that confirmed it. The quote comes from written testimony submitted in a 1994 congressional hearing during which executives from the seven largest tobacco companies admitted that there “may be” some health risks to smoking, but denied that cigarettes were addictive, and that they manipulated nicotine levels to make them more so.
A court order compels tobacco companies to apologize in a series of advertisements that will appear in major newspapers and other media if their appeals are rejected.
5. President Ronald Reagan on the Iran-Contra scandal
“In spite of the wildly speculative and false stories of arms for hostages and alleged ransom payments, we did not, repeat, did not, trade weapons or anything else for hostages. Nor will we.”
–President Ronald Reagan, November 13, 1986
The Iran-Contra affair broke when it was revealed that the US government had covertly sold weapons to Iran in spite of an embargo. More illegal still, a portion of the money from the sales was directed to anti-communist rebels in Nicaragua, which Congress had explicitly banned the administration from funding. It remains up for debate how much President Reagan personally knew about the operation, but he had become “frustrated” by a group of Iranian terrorists holding seven Americans hostage in Lebanon, and may have been trying to curry favor with them. In March 1987, he appeared on television and said: “A few months ago I told the American people I did not trade arms for hostages. My heart and my best intentions still tell me that’s true, but the facts and the evidence tell me it is not. As the Tower board reported, what began as a strategic opening to Iran deteriorated, in its implementation, into trading arms for hostages.”
6. The Reagan administration on the the El Mozote massacre
–President Ronald Reagan, November 13, 1986
The Iran-Contra affair broke when it was revealed that the US government had covertly sold weapons to Iran in spite of an embargo. More illegal still, a portion of the money from the sales was directed to anti-communist rebels in Nicaragua, which Congress had explicitly banned the administration from funding. It remains up for debate how much President Reagan personally knew about the operation, but he had become “frustrated” by a group of Iranian terrorists holding seven Americans hostage in Lebanon, and may have been trying to curry favor with them. In March 1987, he appeared on television and said: “A few months ago I told the American people I did not trade arms for hostages. My heart and my best intentions still tell me that’s true, but the facts and the evidence tell me it is not. As the Tower board reported, what began as a strategic opening to Iran deteriorated, in its implementation, into trading arms for hostages.”
6. The Reagan administration on the the El Mozote massacre
“There is no evidence to confirm that [US-supported El Salvador] government forces systematically massacred civilians in the [El Mozote] operations zone.”
–Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders, February 8, 1982
The US initially denied that the American-supported right-wing government of El Salvador massacred roughly 800 innocent villagers in a counterinsurgency campaign against left-wing guerillas. The massacre was one of the deadliest incidents of the proxy battles the US engaged in throughout the world during the final decades of the Cold War. Enders made the statement above roughly a week after eyewitness accounts of the murders appeared in major American newspapers.
7. President Richard Nixon on the Watergate break-in
–Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders, February 8, 1982
The US initially denied that the American-supported right-wing government of El Salvador massacred roughly 800 innocent villagers in a counterinsurgency campaign against left-wing guerillas. The massacre was one of the deadliest incidents of the proxy battles the US engaged in throughout the world during the final decades of the Cold War. Enders made the statement above roughly a week after eyewitness accounts of the murders appeared in major American newspapers.
7. President Richard Nixon on the Watergate break-in
“I can say categorically that… no one in the White House staff, no one in this administration, presently employed, was involved in this very bizarre incident.”
–President Richard Nixon, discussing the Watergate burglary, August 29, 1972
In fact, many of Nixon’s top staffers were involved in what would come to be known as the Watergate scandal. In June 1973, former White House counsel John Dean testified that he discussed the Watergate cover-up effort with Nixon at least 35 times. Nixon resigned the following summer. “I deeply regret any injuries that may have been done in the course of the events that led to this decision,” he said.
8. President Richard Nixon on covert operations in Chile
–President Richard Nixon, discussing the Watergate burglary, August 29, 1972
In fact, many of Nixon’s top staffers were involved in what would come to be known as the Watergate scandal. In June 1973, former White House counsel John Dean testified that he discussed the Watergate cover-up effort with Nixon at least 35 times. Nixon resigned the following summer. “I deeply regret any injuries that may have been done in the course of the events that led to this decision,” he said.
8. President Richard Nixon on covert operations in Chile
“For us to have intervened [in Chile] – intervened in a free election and to have turned it around – I think would have had repercussions all over Latin America…”
–President Richard Nixon, January 4, 1971
The US was, in fact, carrying out covert operations in Chile, and was providing funding through the CIA to overthrow the newly elected Marxist President Salvadore Allende. Nixon even joked about their semi-successful efforts later in 1971 with Henry Kissinger, a conversation caught on Nixon’s infamous taping system. In 1973, the US-backed anti-government forces would be successful; in a violent coup, General Augusto Pinochet overthrew Allende’s government. Pinochet’s new government killed at least 3,197 people and tortured about 29,000 during a 17-year rule. Nixon was, however, partially correct: American efforts to unseat left-leaning governments and replace them with right-wing dictators did have “repercussions all over Latin America” — and around the world.
9. President Lyndon Johnson on the Vietnam War
–President Richard Nixon, January 4, 1971
The US was, in fact, carrying out covert operations in Chile, and was providing funding through the CIA to overthrow the newly elected Marxist President Salvadore Allende. Nixon even joked about their semi-successful efforts later in 1971 with Henry Kissinger, a conversation caught on Nixon’s infamous taping system. In 1973, the US-backed anti-government forces would be successful; in a violent coup, General Augusto Pinochet overthrew Allende’s government. Pinochet’s new government killed at least 3,197 people and tortured about 29,000 during a 17-year rule. Nixon was, however, partially correct: American efforts to unseat left-leaning governments and replace them with right-wing dictators did have “repercussions all over Latin America” — and around the world.
9. President Lyndon Johnson on the Vietnam War
“We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves.”
–President Lyndon Johnson, October 1964
In total, 3,403,000 US service members were deployed to Southeast Asia between 1964 and 1975. Roughly 60,000 were killed, and over 150,000 were injured. Millions of Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians also died in the war.
10. Senator Joseph McCarthy on communism
–President Lyndon Johnson, October 1964
In total, 3,403,000 US service members were deployed to Southeast Asia between 1964 and 1975. Roughly 60,000 were killed, and over 150,000 were injured. Millions of Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians also died in the war.
10. Senator Joseph McCarthy on communism
“I have here in my hand a list of 205 [State Department employees] that were known to the secretary of state as being members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping the policy of the State Department.”
–Senator Joseph McCarthy, February 9, 1950
This statement was Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy’s first declaration setting off the phenomenon that would later bare his name, McCarthyism, also known as the second red scare. He would go on to accuse an array of institutions and public figures of being communist sympathizers. His allegations were almost all false.
–Senator Joseph McCarthy, February 9, 1950
This statement was Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy’s first declaration setting off the phenomenon that would later bare his name, McCarthyism, also known as the second red scare. He would go on to accuse an array of institutions and public figures of being communist sympathizers. His allegations were almost all false.
Drone Debate
Congress Must Speak Up in the Drone Debate
Until now, the information available publicly about the targeting and killing of American citizens abroad came to us through leaked documents and unauthorized statements by government officials. As a result of these leaks, President Obama’s drone policy has been hotly debated.
This week, a bi-partisan panel issued a report on America’s drone policy. It concluded: “There is no indication that a US strategy to destroy Al Qaeda has curbed the rise of Sunni Islamic extremism, deterred the establishment of Shia Islamic extremist groups or advanced long-term US security interests.”
Over the past two years, however, much of the focus of public discussion has been on the president’s legal justification for the program. In other words, whether you agree or disagree with the use of drone killing as good policy in the fight against terrorism, it had not been established that the president was even acting lawfully under federal statutes and the Constitution when he kills an American citizen overseas. Indeed, we had been left completely in the dark about his legal rationale until a Justice Department white paper on the subject was leaked to NBC in 2013. I analyzed the legal reasoning in the white paper in an interview with BillMoyers.com last year, and found it unpersuasive to support the lawfulness of the killing of Mr. al-Alwaki. The panel also criticized the administration’s “secret rationale” for the program in their report.
But this week there has been another new development. After being ordered to do so by a federal judge, the Department of Justice released a heavily redacted version of the July 16, 2010 memorandum from its Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). This memorandum, along with others that have yet to be released, purports to be a fuller explanation of the summarized legal analysis in the leaked white paper. These memos, we are told, informed President Obama’s decision to kill Mr. al-Alwaki.
For those of us who were hoping to have a better understanding of the legal justification for our government killing one of its own citizens, however, we were sadly disappointed. The legal rationales in the white paper were thin and relied on interpretations of Supreme Court precedent that was, at best, a stretch and, at worst, a distortion of the Court’s prior reasoning. What we needed from the fuller memorandum released this week was more facts and they, not surprisingly, were redacted from the memo.
All legal analysis is dependent on the facts. Law does not exist in a vacuum, and only has meaning as it is applied to the specific circumstances at hand. David Barron, the author of the memo, and then Acting Chief of OLC, liberally and wisely salted throughout the document that his legal analysis depended on the facts as supplied to DOJ by the intelligence agencies.
So he relied on “facts” that are a collection of intelligence reports, themselves not proof of anything, and we, the American people, cannot know what those “facts” are.
Therein lies the rub.
The analysis of the federal law (foreign murder statutes) and constitutional (due process) legal rationales here are totally fact-dependent. What do we know about Mr. al-Alwaki’s plans and intentions to do us harm, and was he an “imminent threat” justifying killing him? Also factual, and redacted from our view, is the intelligence agencies’ reports to Mr. Barron that capture was “not feasible.”
So we are back where we started and, frankly, it is not surprising. Of course, government lawyers must rely on classified information to make legal judgments about whether a proposed action by the president is lawful and constitutional. And, of course, that classified information cannot be made public without risking intelligence sources and methods, and possibly endangering lives.
That is why we need judges. Judges can review classified information and determine if it meets the legal tests and reaches the threshold for action. Here all we have is executive branch officials reviewing the intelligence and assuring us that it is solidly sourced and sufficiently detailed to meet the applicable legal standards. That is not good enough.
There is only one way to get our judicial branch involved in the decision to kill our citizens abroad – Congress must act. After learning of executive branch abuses, in 1978 Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which required judicial review before the FBI and NSA could conduct electronic surveillance inside the United States. This law was amended in 2008 also to require judicial review to wiretap an American overseas.
So Congress has required judges to be involved, and to review the intelligence, before we tap an American’s phone in Yemen. But Congress has not stepped up to require judicial review before we kill our own citizens. This needs to change.
by Vicki Divoll
We have known for more than a decade about the targeted killing of suspected terrorists overseas by unmanned drones. But in 2010 President Obama took that tactic to a new level – he placed a United States citizen on the kill list. And in September 2011, Anwar al-Alwaki, born in New Mexico, was killed in Yemen by his own government.
Until now, the information available publicly about the targeting and killing of American citizens abroad came to us through leaked documents and unauthorized statements by government officials. As a result of these leaks, President Obama’s drone policy has been hotly debated.
This week, a bi-partisan panel issued a report on America’s drone policy. It concluded: “There is no indication that a US strategy to destroy Al Qaeda has curbed the rise of Sunni Islamic extremism, deterred the establishment of Shia Islamic extremist groups or advanced long-term US security interests.”
Over the past two years, however, much of the focus of public discussion has been on the president’s legal justification for the program. In other words, whether you agree or disagree with the use of drone killing as good policy in the fight against terrorism, it had not been established that the president was even acting lawfully under federal statutes and the Constitution when he kills an American citizen overseas. Indeed, we had been left completely in the dark about his legal rationale until a Justice Department white paper on the subject was leaked to NBC in 2013. I analyzed the legal reasoning in the white paper in an interview with BillMoyers.com last year, and found it unpersuasive to support the lawfulness of the killing of Mr. al-Alwaki. The panel also criticized the administration’s “secret rationale” for the program in their report.
But this week there has been another new development. After being ordered to do so by a federal judge, the Department of Justice released a heavily redacted version of the July 16, 2010 memorandum from its Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). This memorandum, along with others that have yet to be released, purports to be a fuller explanation of the summarized legal analysis in the leaked white paper. These memos, we are told, informed President Obama’s decision to kill Mr. al-Alwaki.
For those of us who were hoping to have a better understanding of the legal justification for our government killing one of its own citizens, however, we were sadly disappointed. The legal rationales in the white paper were thin and relied on interpretations of Supreme Court precedent that was, at best, a stretch and, at worst, a distortion of the Court’s prior reasoning. What we needed from the fuller memorandum released this week was more facts and they, not surprisingly, were redacted from the memo.
All legal analysis is dependent on the facts. Law does not exist in a vacuum, and only has meaning as it is applied to the specific circumstances at hand. David Barron, the author of the memo, and then Acting Chief of OLC, liberally and wisely salted throughout the document that his legal analysis depended on the facts as supplied to DOJ by the intelligence agencies.
So he relied on “facts” that are a collection of intelligence reports, themselves not proof of anything, and we, the American people, cannot know what those “facts” are.
Therein lies the rub.
The analysis of the federal law (foreign murder statutes) and constitutional (due process) legal rationales here are totally fact-dependent. What do we know about Mr. al-Alwaki’s plans and intentions to do us harm, and was he an “imminent threat” justifying killing him? Also factual, and redacted from our view, is the intelligence agencies’ reports to Mr. Barron that capture was “not feasible.”
So we are back where we started and, frankly, it is not surprising. Of course, government lawyers must rely on classified information to make legal judgments about whether a proposed action by the president is lawful and constitutional. And, of course, that classified information cannot be made public without risking intelligence sources and methods, and possibly endangering lives.
That is why we need judges. Judges can review classified information and determine if it meets the legal tests and reaches the threshold for action. Here all we have is executive branch officials reviewing the intelligence and assuring us that it is solidly sourced and sufficiently detailed to meet the applicable legal standards. That is not good enough.
There is only one way to get our judicial branch involved in the decision to kill our citizens abroad – Congress must act. After learning of executive branch abuses, in 1978 Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which required judicial review before the FBI and NSA could conduct electronic surveillance inside the United States. This law was amended in 2008 also to require judicial review to wiretap an American overseas.
So Congress has required judges to be involved, and to review the intelligence, before we tap an American’s phone in Yemen. But Congress has not stepped up to require judicial review before we kill our own citizens. This needs to change.
The Lies That Lead to War
BILL MOYERS:There couldn’t be a more timely book than this one -- "935 Lies: The Future of Truth and the Decline of America’s Moral Integrity," by Charles Lewis, one of our premier journalists who has inspired many of us in this craft to aim high and dig deep.
First and foremost an investigative reporter, Chuck Lewis produced some of “60 Minutes” hardest-hitting stories. He left CBS News to found the Center for Public Integrity, one of the largest, nonprofit, investigative reporting publishers in the world. He wrote this "New York Times" bestseller "The Buying of the President 2004" and four other investigative books.
As for his new one, those “935 Lies” in the title were uncovered in a three-year study of the rush to war in Iraq by the Center for Public Integrity and the Fund for Independence in Journalism. It is, Lewis writes, a record of what “…US government officials said to cause most Americans and their elected representatives to completely ignore facts, logic, and reason…”
Timely, too, for another reason: 50 years ago this August, President Lyndon Johnson, at whose side I was then working, seized on obscure and unverified events on the other side of the world to rush Congress into the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, a motion that he turned into a blank check for escalating the war in Vietnam. As Chuck Lewis rightly says, it was “a monumental misrepresentation.” Welcome.
BILL MOYERS: Welcome.
CHARLES LEWIS: It’s great to be here.
BILL MOYERS: Do you think George W. Bush lied about Iraq? Do you think Lyndon Johnson lied about Vietnam?
CHARLES LEWIS: Yes. I do. You know, I've, I tried very hard. You know, in the case of Bush, I actually was trying to give him the benefit of the doubt.
Because if someone believes it, if it's a matter of conviction and they've persuaded themselves of something that's untrue, is that a lie? Or do they just have misguided beliefs that, you know. And I tried to give Bush the benefit of the doubt there.
But over time, each passing year, I've decided that I was way too generous. And the-- I look at flatly: did they make statements that weren't true? The answer is yes. Did they decide they were going to willfully do that over a period of two years? And was it an orchestrated campaign? And it was false statements.
Those were not coincidental. If you look who said what, when. And the when, especially, is quite relevant. This was an orchestrated campaign. Which, of course, Scott McClellan, the press secretary to Bush, publicly essentially said in his memoir after our report, “Iraq: The War Card” came out, by the way, a few months later. So, yeah, I believe in both cases, Lyndon Johnson and George W. Bush, they knew what they were saying was not right. They knew it was not precise or accurate. And they knew it would mislead the American people but also do what they wanted to do. In both cases they had an agenda. That's what I believe.
BILL MOYERS: Well, you've said that we should never underestimate the capacity for self-delusion. Who was it who said that convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies? I mean, they can believe it so completely, be so self-deluded, right? That--
CHARLES LEWIS: Wow, exactly. All the Bush folks. Bush, Cheney. No one has done a candid interview with them where they actually pin their ears to the wall and ask them the tough ques-- I have not seen anyone do that. That's not coincidental. They’ve never been called before Congress. Now what is that about? We used to have this idea of checks and balances. We don’t have any checks and balances.
The Bush administration also destroys tens of millions of emails that no one could see. So, I mean, and no one said anything about it. They had 69 emails accounts that were done through the Republican Party while they were conducting business, knowing that's a private corporation, not part of the United States government.
So, all of this deceit and elaborate efforts to deflect the public from, oh, yeah, the truth, it's pretty outrageous. And we don't-- and so we'll never see some of those emails, ever, I think. And that, to me, is tragic. But, I have enough, I've seen enough now to make a conclusion. Yes, we were absolutely misled, and yes, they did lie. And they, maybe they were lying to themselves. Maybe they actually have come to believe what they're saying. They probably, many of them, some of them, at least, probably do. But they'll never say it on television. And I don't even know if they'll tell their spouses. Who will ever say? I don't know.
BILL MOYERS: Your book traces from the Gulf of Tonkin right on through the Vietnam War. And it traces from the buildup to Iraq to the aftermath of Iraq. And in both cases you clearly outline a pattern of deception that was continued over a long while.
CHARLES LEWIS: It's clear. In both cases those in power knew what they were doing. And those in power had a plan. And those in power orchestrated their plan. And the American people, in both instances, were completely in the dark.
And thousands of lives were lost in both cases. And the fact that we did and it's not a partisan thing. They were two different presidents, two different parties, 40 years apart. But guess what, folks? It was the same basic thing. We wanted to do a war of choice.
BILL MOYERS: When the reports came back from the Gulf of Tonkin, Lyndon Johnson believed them. I know that. I was--
CHARLES LEWIS: Right.
BILL MOYERS: --right there by the tragedy is he acted before they could be verified and before--
CHARLES LEWIS: Right.
BILL MOYERS: --he could get it right. And then he started telling himself that he did the right thing even though the initial information was misleading. And the more he told himself that he was doing the right thing, because there was this danger out here, and that he used it to get the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed, he then felt he had to keep telling it.
CHARLES LEWIS: Wow. Yeah.
BILL MOYERS: Pretty soon--
CHARLES LEWIS: Then you're a prisoner to your statements.
BILL MOYERS: Yeah.
CHARLES LEWIS: I understand that dynamic.
BILL MOYERS: What have you learned about how Washington goes to war?
CHARLES LEWIS: What I learned is that it's orchestrated. They frame it in a way that’s palatable to the largest possible audience. And they'll say it many, many, many times. That's the most recent way to do it.
BILL MOYERS: Why is the press so complicit in helping them frame it?
CHARLES LEWIS: Well, they basically do the stenography of listening to whatever those in power say and reporting it. They see their first duty wrongly, I think, to just report what's said with very little analysis or critical commentary. And they've been doing that, actually, for a very long time. But they've done it. It's gotten worse over time.
The Washington press corps is a prisoner of what they're assigned to cover. And that's basically whatever officialdom tells them.
But if you say something several times, hundreds of times; there are scientific studies that show we will tend to believe it if we've heard it a lot, even if we actually are not clear at all whether it's true. We just come to assume it's true, why otherwise we wouldn't be hearing this, right? And so we're basically prisoners of whatever folks tell us who are in power.
The problem now is government has more PR people and public relations firms than journalists. And we actually have 1/3 fewer professional reporters. That's a really rotten combination there. No wonder we're easily bamboozled.
BILL MOYERS: So for the last two weeks you could hardly turn on the television set without seeing the architects and the cheerleaders of the invasion of Iraq 11 years ago being asked their opinion now of what the US should do in Iraq.
So there was ABC's Jonathan Karl just the other day turning to Dick Cheney and asking, "What would you do in Iraq?" There wasn't a bit of irony in his voice or in his eyes.
CHARLES LEWIS: Well, it's an abomination. There's a moral problem here. They're not telling the full truth. And they're presenting themselves, the media, a false image. But I know, as a veteran from the networks, actually, I know exactly what that dynamic is. And you are rewarded for the gets you have. The people you-- big names that—
BILL MOYERS: The interview you get. Yeah, the--
CHARLES LEWIS: Right. And if you rip them to shreds, guess what, they're not going to come on your show. I've noticed that, as Mike Wallace's producer.
BILL MOYERS: You've lived in Washington how long now?
CHARLES LEWIS: Boy, wow, it's really scary; 40 years.
BILL MOYERS: So what did you learn in doing this book over the last nine years that you didn't know?
CHARLES LEWIS: Well, it's possible I was in danger of becoming cynical before. But I have to say the extent of the lies. I actually didn't realize the pervasiveness. I just thought that occasionally some turkey would lie. I mean, and but the, it was the extent of this. This is a systemic problem we have here. We have an inability to get the truth in real time. And the media has complete inability to find out the truth in real time. And when it's right in front of their face, they don't always report it. And so we really have a problem here because if we don't know what the truth is in this country, we don't have a country. It's end of story. It's not our country anymore. This is fundamental. And if the public doesn't care about facts then journalists, frankly, are not terribly relevant either. I had a professional crisis. Like, why am I doing this if no one cares and false information is what they believe, not the actual information?
BILL MOYERS: You know James Risen, "The New York Times" reporter, right?
CHARLES LEWIS: Uh-huh.
BILL MOYERS: He has refused to testify before a grand jury, under subpoena, and reveal a confidential source of information in his book, "State of War," about the secret US campaign against the Iranian nuclear program. The Supreme Court has refused to hear his case. And Risen now says he will go to jail if necessary. What are the stakes in this case?
CHARLES LEWIS: Well, they're very high. I mean, there's very-- they're very high for Jim in particular, obviously. He could end up in prison, found in contempt by a judge for not testifying, not answering some questions the government asks. If it gets to that point. There is a chance that the US Justice Department will choose to not proceed at this point. There's been at least some indication that's possible. I don't know that it'll happen. I'm certainly hoping that happens. But there's a dirty little secret about national security reporting. There's only about 15 or so people that do that full-time in the United States. In a country of 300-plus million people, only 15 or so do it for a full-time job. And Jim Risen happens to be one. And as you know he's the one who co-authored the domestic surveillance stories that won the Pulitzer back in '05.
Today the dirty little secret in Washington is that we have thousands of cameras. Every cell phone has a GPS tracking device. And you also can't check into any government agency and sign in to get into meet with someone because the government has that information, and they'll know who came.
And if you call them, their calls are potentially monitored. And there is a general belief widely shared that your emails are scraped, or at least accessed. And I know journalists who've been told privately by folks in the NSA and elsewhere that that's basically not untrue. And so you have a situation here. They know who his source was.
BILL MOYERS: They do?
CHARLES LEWIS: They do. And they have multiple ways in which they've identified who it is. And that's why they brought a case and they have enough evidence that they hope and they think to convict this person. They've already--
BILL MOYERS: They want to convict the source.
CHARLES LEWIS: They want to convict the source. And they want to have Jim Risen be the one who helps them do it. But they don't want to necessarily betray their intelligence ways that they found out that may or may, they may be legal, because they're government employees, but they're going to appear to be unseemly because they involved monitoring of employees and pulling all kinds of things.
So we have a little-- another strange thing going on here where the government doesn't really want to go anywhere near this subject. And so they would like-- so we're all looking at Jim Risen and whether he goes to prison. And the real issue is actually the government. What are they mad about? Well, he did a story and a chapter in his book, “State of War,” that actually showed that the CIA sent nuclear information to Iran. Oops. And they are livid.
BILL MOYERS: Something we might want to know about.
CHARLES LEWIS: Yep. Yeah, yeah. Exactly.
BILL MOYERS: Right? Might want to know that the government responsible to the people was actually making these serious mistakes?
CHARLES LEWIS: Yeah. It's unbelievable that they were doing that. And it's unbelievable. And so Risen breaks that story in the book. And they are mad that he did this. And they, frankly, embarrassed them. And so they're trying-- this is retribution. I think it has very little to do with anything but retribution.
But I also think what is really disturbing now is the difficulty of doing this type of reporting was never easy. Now it is probably more difficult than it's ever been in US history. And President Obama has used the Espionage Act against journalists more than any president in US history.
BILL MOYERS: I think even Nixon only used it once against--
CHARLES LEWIS: Right.
BILL MOYERS: --Daniel Ellsberg who leaked the Pentagon Papers. And Obama's used it how many--?
CHARLES LEWIS: Eight times. It's unbelievable. And--
BILL MOYERS: The Espionage Act.
CHARLES LEWIS: Right, the Espionage Act. And who would've ever imagined that? This is something Obama never talked about in campaigns. He never publicly said he was going to go do this. And like a lot of things in his administration, he's trying to have it both ways.
He's supporting a shield law, to some extent, in Congress for journalists. But on the other hand he's criminalizing investigative reporting by going after sources. And so he's throwing a bone, or being accommodating to the national security establishment in Washington, which, you know, in just a couple-year period did 76 million classified documents. Far more than any time in US history. And so he's a prisoner to that community to a large extent. And this is a fellow who didn't know anything about foreign policy. Was a state legislator in Illinois and was a one-term senator. And suddenly he's become more hawkish against reporters than George W. Bush. I don’t know anyone who saw that coming.
BILL MOYERS: What does he know we don't know about?
CHARLES LEWIS: That is really a peculiar thing. And it's not been adequately ventilated. And journalists haven't asked Obama directly the few times they had direct access.
BILL MOYERS: So what's at stake if we do silence and punish whistleblowers?
CHARLES LEWIS: Well, what's at stake is whistleblowers won't come forward. They know they're going to be prosecuted. They know they're being monitored. A lot of sources have dried up. There have been some panels in the last year, too, in the journalistic realm. And folks have talked about how it's harder to find people to talk now because they fear retribution.
They know that the surveillance has gotten incredibly intense. And the stakes are incredibly high. And they get that. And so a lot of folks are who might be inclined to leak and leakers are wonderful. Because they tell reporters what they don't already have and they can't find in any document. They're very essential.
BILL MOYERS: If Edward Snowden had offered you the NSA documents, would you have published them?
CHARLES LEWIS: I would've liked to. He didn't call.
BILL MOYERS: But if he had?
CHARLES LEWIS: I would. I would have. You know, when I ran the Center for Public Integrity, we posted the Patriot Two Act. We were told by the top aide to the attorney general, "Don't do it. You will be sorry if you do." And we quoted them by name in our article and we posted within minutes.
BILL MOYERS: For my younger viewers, what's the Patriot Two Act?
CHARLES LEWIS: The Patriot-- it was called the Patriot Two Act, the Domestic Enhancement Security Act of 2003, to be precise. And they were introducing it just days before the invasion of Iraq, perhaps hoping no one would notice. It took the Patriot Act, which substantially limited civil liberties for large number of Americans and in general, upped the ante about security in America and it took it to a whole another place.
CHARLES LEWIS: The Patriot Two Act was far more restrictive.
BILL MOYERS: When you released this document against the wishes of the government, were there any personal repercussions to you and your organization?
CHARLES LEWIS: There weren't any repercussions from that. But I, you know, I had other things happen. We were sued by Russian billionaire oligarchs for a story we did about Dick Cheney and Halliburton and their business activities in Siberia. That suit went on for five years. It was dismissed.
But, you know, generally, we're not this is a fortunate country in that sense. We don't generally kill journalists or even beat them up, unlike other countries.
BILL MOYERS: Can democracy die of too many lies?
CHARLES LEWIS: I don't think there's any question about it. You're usually the one who quotes scripture. But my only thing I could ever quote, I may not even have it perfectly right, but from Proverbs. "When there is no vision, the people perish." That happens to be one of the all-time, most interesting statements I've ever heard.
And I think if you don't know what's going to happen and you don't know what is happening, how are you going to embrace any problem of our time with any seriousness? If all you're ever doing are two parties fighting over everything and everything is debatable, and you can never reach a consensus on any single thing, and you don't even have common goals anymore, what are we here?
Starting to wonder. And so I actually-- it goes pretty deep here. I think this is so fundamental. And I don't-- I think the only thing we have that we can learn is I do believe that old saw, information is power. I think if we learn what the truth is, we find out what is actually happening, and we have the facts, we can act on them. But there are still many Americans who won't. I reconcile that, myself to that. But there are a lot of Americans who need to frankly, start paying attention.
BILL MOYERS: The book is “935 Lies: The Future of Truth and the Decline of America's Moral Integrity.” Chuck Lewis, thanks for being with me.
CHARLES LEWIS: Thanks for having me.
First and foremost an investigative reporter, Chuck Lewis produced some of “60 Minutes” hardest-hitting stories. He left CBS News to found the Center for Public Integrity, one of the largest, nonprofit, investigative reporting publishers in the world. He wrote this "New York Times" bestseller "The Buying of the President 2004" and four other investigative books.
As for his new one, those “935 Lies” in the title were uncovered in a three-year study of the rush to war in Iraq by the Center for Public Integrity and the Fund for Independence in Journalism. It is, Lewis writes, a record of what “…US government officials said to cause most Americans and their elected representatives to completely ignore facts, logic, and reason…”
Timely, too, for another reason: 50 years ago this August, President Lyndon Johnson, at whose side I was then working, seized on obscure and unverified events on the other side of the world to rush Congress into the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, a motion that he turned into a blank check for escalating the war in Vietnam. As Chuck Lewis rightly says, it was “a monumental misrepresentation.” Welcome.
BILL MOYERS: Welcome.
CHARLES LEWIS: It’s great to be here.
BILL MOYERS: Do you think George W. Bush lied about Iraq? Do you think Lyndon Johnson lied about Vietnam?
CHARLES LEWIS: Yes. I do. You know, I've, I tried very hard. You know, in the case of Bush, I actually was trying to give him the benefit of the doubt.
Because if someone believes it, if it's a matter of conviction and they've persuaded themselves of something that's untrue, is that a lie? Or do they just have misguided beliefs that, you know. And I tried to give Bush the benefit of the doubt there.
But over time, each passing year, I've decided that I was way too generous. And the-- I look at flatly: did they make statements that weren't true? The answer is yes. Did they decide they were going to willfully do that over a period of two years? And was it an orchestrated campaign? And it was false statements.
Those were not coincidental. If you look who said what, when. And the when, especially, is quite relevant. This was an orchestrated campaign. Which, of course, Scott McClellan, the press secretary to Bush, publicly essentially said in his memoir after our report, “Iraq: The War Card” came out, by the way, a few months later. So, yeah, I believe in both cases, Lyndon Johnson and George W. Bush, they knew what they were saying was not right. They knew it was not precise or accurate. And they knew it would mislead the American people but also do what they wanted to do. In both cases they had an agenda. That's what I believe.
BILL MOYERS: Well, you've said that we should never underestimate the capacity for self-delusion. Who was it who said that convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies? I mean, they can believe it so completely, be so self-deluded, right? That--
CHARLES LEWIS: Wow, exactly. All the Bush folks. Bush, Cheney. No one has done a candid interview with them where they actually pin their ears to the wall and ask them the tough ques-- I have not seen anyone do that. That's not coincidental. They’ve never been called before Congress. Now what is that about? We used to have this idea of checks and balances. We don’t have any checks and balances.
The Bush administration also destroys tens of millions of emails that no one could see. So, I mean, and no one said anything about it. They had 69 emails accounts that were done through the Republican Party while they were conducting business, knowing that's a private corporation, not part of the United States government.
So, all of this deceit and elaborate efforts to deflect the public from, oh, yeah, the truth, it's pretty outrageous. And we don't-- and so we'll never see some of those emails, ever, I think. And that, to me, is tragic. But, I have enough, I've seen enough now to make a conclusion. Yes, we were absolutely misled, and yes, they did lie. And they, maybe they were lying to themselves. Maybe they actually have come to believe what they're saying. They probably, many of them, some of them, at least, probably do. But they'll never say it on television. And I don't even know if they'll tell their spouses. Who will ever say? I don't know.
BILL MOYERS: Your book traces from the Gulf of Tonkin right on through the Vietnam War. And it traces from the buildup to Iraq to the aftermath of Iraq. And in both cases you clearly outline a pattern of deception that was continued over a long while.
CHARLES LEWIS: It's clear. In both cases those in power knew what they were doing. And those in power had a plan. And those in power orchestrated their plan. And the American people, in both instances, were completely in the dark.
And thousands of lives were lost in both cases. And the fact that we did and it's not a partisan thing. They were two different presidents, two different parties, 40 years apart. But guess what, folks? It was the same basic thing. We wanted to do a war of choice.
BILL MOYERS: When the reports came back from the Gulf of Tonkin, Lyndon Johnson believed them. I know that. I was--
CHARLES LEWIS: Right.
BILL MOYERS: --right there by the tragedy is he acted before they could be verified and before--
CHARLES LEWIS: Right.
BILL MOYERS: --he could get it right. And then he started telling himself that he did the right thing even though the initial information was misleading. And the more he told himself that he was doing the right thing, because there was this danger out here, and that he used it to get the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed, he then felt he had to keep telling it.
CHARLES LEWIS: Wow. Yeah.
BILL MOYERS: Pretty soon--
CHARLES LEWIS: Then you're a prisoner to your statements.
BILL MOYERS: Yeah.
CHARLES LEWIS: I understand that dynamic.
BILL MOYERS: What have you learned about how Washington goes to war?
CHARLES LEWIS: What I learned is that it's orchestrated. They frame it in a way that’s palatable to the largest possible audience. And they'll say it many, many, many times. That's the most recent way to do it.
BILL MOYERS: Why is the press so complicit in helping them frame it?
CHARLES LEWIS: Well, they basically do the stenography of listening to whatever those in power say and reporting it. They see their first duty wrongly, I think, to just report what's said with very little analysis or critical commentary. And they've been doing that, actually, for a very long time. But they've done it. It's gotten worse over time.
The Washington press corps is a prisoner of what they're assigned to cover. And that's basically whatever officialdom tells them.
But if you say something several times, hundreds of times; there are scientific studies that show we will tend to believe it if we've heard it a lot, even if we actually are not clear at all whether it's true. We just come to assume it's true, why otherwise we wouldn't be hearing this, right? And so we're basically prisoners of whatever folks tell us who are in power.
The problem now is government has more PR people and public relations firms than journalists. And we actually have 1/3 fewer professional reporters. That's a really rotten combination there. No wonder we're easily bamboozled.
BILL MOYERS: So for the last two weeks you could hardly turn on the television set without seeing the architects and the cheerleaders of the invasion of Iraq 11 years ago being asked their opinion now of what the US should do in Iraq.
So there was ABC's Jonathan Karl just the other day turning to Dick Cheney and asking, "What would you do in Iraq?" There wasn't a bit of irony in his voice or in his eyes.
CHARLES LEWIS: Well, it's an abomination. There's a moral problem here. They're not telling the full truth. And they're presenting themselves, the media, a false image. But I know, as a veteran from the networks, actually, I know exactly what that dynamic is. And you are rewarded for the gets you have. The people you-- big names that—
BILL MOYERS: The interview you get. Yeah, the--
CHARLES LEWIS: Right. And if you rip them to shreds, guess what, they're not going to come on your show. I've noticed that, as Mike Wallace's producer.
BILL MOYERS: You've lived in Washington how long now?
CHARLES LEWIS: Boy, wow, it's really scary; 40 years.
BILL MOYERS: So what did you learn in doing this book over the last nine years that you didn't know?
CHARLES LEWIS: Well, it's possible I was in danger of becoming cynical before. But I have to say the extent of the lies. I actually didn't realize the pervasiveness. I just thought that occasionally some turkey would lie. I mean, and but the, it was the extent of this. This is a systemic problem we have here. We have an inability to get the truth in real time. And the media has complete inability to find out the truth in real time. And when it's right in front of their face, they don't always report it. And so we really have a problem here because if we don't know what the truth is in this country, we don't have a country. It's end of story. It's not our country anymore. This is fundamental. And if the public doesn't care about facts then journalists, frankly, are not terribly relevant either. I had a professional crisis. Like, why am I doing this if no one cares and false information is what they believe, not the actual information?
BILL MOYERS: You know James Risen, "The New York Times" reporter, right?
CHARLES LEWIS: Uh-huh.
BILL MOYERS: He has refused to testify before a grand jury, under subpoena, and reveal a confidential source of information in his book, "State of War," about the secret US campaign against the Iranian nuclear program. The Supreme Court has refused to hear his case. And Risen now says he will go to jail if necessary. What are the stakes in this case?
CHARLES LEWIS: Well, they're very high. I mean, there's very-- they're very high for Jim in particular, obviously. He could end up in prison, found in contempt by a judge for not testifying, not answering some questions the government asks. If it gets to that point. There is a chance that the US Justice Department will choose to not proceed at this point. There's been at least some indication that's possible. I don't know that it'll happen. I'm certainly hoping that happens. But there's a dirty little secret about national security reporting. There's only about 15 or so people that do that full-time in the United States. In a country of 300-plus million people, only 15 or so do it for a full-time job. And Jim Risen happens to be one. And as you know he's the one who co-authored the domestic surveillance stories that won the Pulitzer back in '05.
Today the dirty little secret in Washington is that we have thousands of cameras. Every cell phone has a GPS tracking device. And you also can't check into any government agency and sign in to get into meet with someone because the government has that information, and they'll know who came.
And if you call them, their calls are potentially monitored. And there is a general belief widely shared that your emails are scraped, or at least accessed. And I know journalists who've been told privately by folks in the NSA and elsewhere that that's basically not untrue. And so you have a situation here. They know who his source was.
BILL MOYERS: They do?
CHARLES LEWIS: They do. And they have multiple ways in which they've identified who it is. And that's why they brought a case and they have enough evidence that they hope and they think to convict this person. They've already--
BILL MOYERS: They want to convict the source.
CHARLES LEWIS: They want to convict the source. And they want to have Jim Risen be the one who helps them do it. But they don't want to necessarily betray their intelligence ways that they found out that may or may, they may be legal, because they're government employees, but they're going to appear to be unseemly because they involved monitoring of employees and pulling all kinds of things.
So we have a little-- another strange thing going on here where the government doesn't really want to go anywhere near this subject. And so they would like-- so we're all looking at Jim Risen and whether he goes to prison. And the real issue is actually the government. What are they mad about? Well, he did a story and a chapter in his book, “State of War,” that actually showed that the CIA sent nuclear information to Iran. Oops. And they are livid.
BILL MOYERS: Something we might want to know about.
CHARLES LEWIS: Yep. Yeah, yeah. Exactly.
BILL MOYERS: Right? Might want to know that the government responsible to the people was actually making these serious mistakes?
CHARLES LEWIS: Yeah. It's unbelievable that they were doing that. And it's unbelievable. And so Risen breaks that story in the book. And they are mad that he did this. And they, frankly, embarrassed them. And so they're trying-- this is retribution. I think it has very little to do with anything but retribution.
But I also think what is really disturbing now is the difficulty of doing this type of reporting was never easy. Now it is probably more difficult than it's ever been in US history. And President Obama has used the Espionage Act against journalists more than any president in US history.
BILL MOYERS: I think even Nixon only used it once against--
CHARLES LEWIS: Right.
BILL MOYERS: --Daniel Ellsberg who leaked the Pentagon Papers. And Obama's used it how many--?
CHARLES LEWIS: Eight times. It's unbelievable. And--
BILL MOYERS: The Espionage Act.
CHARLES LEWIS: Right, the Espionage Act. And who would've ever imagined that? This is something Obama never talked about in campaigns. He never publicly said he was going to go do this. And like a lot of things in his administration, he's trying to have it both ways.
He's supporting a shield law, to some extent, in Congress for journalists. But on the other hand he's criminalizing investigative reporting by going after sources. And so he's throwing a bone, or being accommodating to the national security establishment in Washington, which, you know, in just a couple-year period did 76 million classified documents. Far more than any time in US history. And so he's a prisoner to that community to a large extent. And this is a fellow who didn't know anything about foreign policy. Was a state legislator in Illinois and was a one-term senator. And suddenly he's become more hawkish against reporters than George W. Bush. I don’t know anyone who saw that coming.
BILL MOYERS: What does he know we don't know about?
CHARLES LEWIS: That is really a peculiar thing. And it's not been adequately ventilated. And journalists haven't asked Obama directly the few times they had direct access.
BILL MOYERS: So what's at stake if we do silence and punish whistleblowers?
CHARLES LEWIS: Well, what's at stake is whistleblowers won't come forward. They know they're going to be prosecuted. They know they're being monitored. A lot of sources have dried up. There have been some panels in the last year, too, in the journalistic realm. And folks have talked about how it's harder to find people to talk now because they fear retribution.
They know that the surveillance has gotten incredibly intense. And the stakes are incredibly high. And they get that. And so a lot of folks are who might be inclined to leak and leakers are wonderful. Because they tell reporters what they don't already have and they can't find in any document. They're very essential.
BILL MOYERS: If Edward Snowden had offered you the NSA documents, would you have published them?
CHARLES LEWIS: I would've liked to. He didn't call.
BILL MOYERS: But if he had?
CHARLES LEWIS: I would. I would have. You know, when I ran the Center for Public Integrity, we posted the Patriot Two Act. We were told by the top aide to the attorney general, "Don't do it. You will be sorry if you do." And we quoted them by name in our article and we posted within minutes.
BILL MOYERS: For my younger viewers, what's the Patriot Two Act?
CHARLES LEWIS: The Patriot-- it was called the Patriot Two Act, the Domestic Enhancement Security Act of 2003, to be precise. And they were introducing it just days before the invasion of Iraq, perhaps hoping no one would notice. It took the Patriot Act, which substantially limited civil liberties for large number of Americans and in general, upped the ante about security in America and it took it to a whole another place.
CHARLES LEWIS: The Patriot Two Act was far more restrictive.
BILL MOYERS: When you released this document against the wishes of the government, were there any personal repercussions to you and your organization?
CHARLES LEWIS: There weren't any repercussions from that. But I, you know, I had other things happen. We were sued by Russian billionaire oligarchs for a story we did about Dick Cheney and Halliburton and their business activities in Siberia. That suit went on for five years. It was dismissed.
But, you know, generally, we're not this is a fortunate country in that sense. We don't generally kill journalists or even beat them up, unlike other countries.
BILL MOYERS: Can democracy die of too many lies?
CHARLES LEWIS: I don't think there's any question about it. You're usually the one who quotes scripture. But my only thing I could ever quote, I may not even have it perfectly right, but from Proverbs. "When there is no vision, the people perish." That happens to be one of the all-time, most interesting statements I've ever heard.
And I think if you don't know what's going to happen and you don't know what is happening, how are you going to embrace any problem of our time with any seriousness? If all you're ever doing are two parties fighting over everything and everything is debatable, and you can never reach a consensus on any single thing, and you don't even have common goals anymore, what are we here?
Starting to wonder. And so I actually-- it goes pretty deep here. I think this is so fundamental. And I don't-- I think the only thing we have that we can learn is I do believe that old saw, information is power. I think if we learn what the truth is, we find out what is actually happening, and we have the facts, we can act on them. But there are still many Americans who won't. I reconcile that, myself to that. But there are a lot of Americans who need to frankly, start paying attention.
BILL MOYERS: The book is “935 Lies: The Future of Truth and the Decline of America's Moral Integrity.” Chuck Lewis, thanks for being with me.
CHARLES LEWIS: Thanks for having me.
NGC 5128
What's happened to the center of this galaxy? Unusual and dramatic dust lanes run across the center of elliptical galaxy Centaurus A. These dust lanes are so thick they almost completely obscure the galaxy's center in visible light. This is particularly unusual as Cen A's red stars and round shape are characteristic of a giant elliptical galaxy, a galaxy type usually low in dark dust. Cen A, also known as NGC 5128, is also unusual compared to an average elliptical galaxy because it contains a higher proportion of young blue stars and is a very strong source of radio emission. Evidence indicates that Cen A is likely the result of the collision of two normal galaxies. During the collision, many young stars were formed, butdetails of the creation of Cen A's unusual dust belts are still being researched. Cen A lies only 13 million light years away, making it the closest active galaxy. Cen A, pictured above, spans 60,000 light years and can be seen with binoculars toward the constellation of Centaurus.
Julia Pfeiffer Burns State Park and Milky Way
To see a vista like this takes patience, hiking, and a camera.Patience was needed in searching out just the right place and waiting for just the right time. A short hike was needed to reach this rugged perch above a secluded cove in Julia Pfeiffer Burns State Park in California, USA. And a camera was needed for the long exposure required to bring out the faint light from stars and nebulae in the background Milky Way galaxy.Moonlight illuminated the hidden beach and inlet behind nearby trees in the above composite image taken last month. Usually obscured McWay Falls is visible just below the image center, while the Pacific Ocean is in view to its right. The above image is a high-resolution sequel to a similar image that appeared last year.
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