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June 30, 2014

Bizarre war in Iraq

Russian bombers, advisers arrive in Iraq to aid in fight against ISIS
The battle for Saddam Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit stretched into a third day Sunday with both the Iraqi government and Islamist insurgents reporting heavy loss as five jet fighters Iraq purchased from Russia arrived.

The head of Iraq’s nascent air force said the jets would soon enter the fight to push back the forces of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria that have seized much of central and northern Iraq in the past three weeks.

“In the coming three or four days the aircraft will be in service to support our forces in the fight” against ISIS and other Sunni rebels, said Gen. Anwar Hama Ameen, the commander of the Iraqi Air Force in a Baghdad briefing.

The fight in Tikrit represents the first major effort by the Iraqi government to reclaim territory lost to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in a surprise takeover of much of central and northern Iraq that began June 10 in Mosul and quickly spread throughout the country. Thousands of Iraqi Army forces backed by Shiite militias are now trying to to battle up Iraq’s main central highway to enter Tikrit, a city of 200,000 that fell to ISIS and its Sunni Muslim tribal allies on June 11.

Both sides claimed the momentum, and there was little independent information on which to judge the likely outcome.

The Iraqi government insisted the operation in Tikrit was going according to plan, while militants and tribal leaders claimed that the government’s main advance from the nearby town of Samarra had bogged down as it encountered roadside bombs the insurgents have planted over the last two weeks.

"The security forces are advancing from different areas" around Tikrit, Lt. Gen. Qassem Atta told reporters in Baghdad. "There are ongoing clashes."

Twitter accounts associated with ISIS claimed that several hundred government troops had been killed and a dozen tanks and armored vehicles destroyed in the battle, but both sides commonly exaggerate both progress and casualties inflicted and neither account could be confirmed.

The handful of residents who have remained in Tikrit _ as much as 70 percent of the town’s population reportedly has fled the government advance _ told local television there was little sign of government forces in the city center but described a number of helicopter attacks that use rudimentary barrel bombs to flatten large parts of the city center ahead of the government advance.

With both sides claiming momentum in the fight, the arrival from Russia of five Su-25 fighter bombers late Saturday night with two more expected to arrive on Sunday could provide an important boost to both Iraqi Army morale and firepower. Twelve Russian technical advisers also arrived with the shipment.

Iraqi news media called the arrival of the Russian equipment _ U.S. F16s are not expected until September _ a warning to the Obama administration over its reluctance to grant an Iraqi government request to begin air strikes against the insurgents. Iraq has virtually no air force and until the arrival of the Russian planes, no jet fighter aircraft in the country.

The quick Russian delivery also underscores the complexity of the Iraqi developments, where the United States finds itself allied with Russia and Iran fighting to preserve Iraq’s central government even as the three countries are on the opposite side of the civil war in Syria, where ISIS is also fighting to topple the government of Syrian President Bashar Assad.

Embattled Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, whose departure from power has become almost a condition for U.S. support, signed a $500 million deal with Russia for the delivery of at least 12 fighter bombers.


Iran and Iraq have also discussed returning as many as 20 aircraft that Saddam’s regime flew to Iran for safety before the 1991 Gulf War with the United States and other allies after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Iran later refused to return the outdated jet fighters, claiming they were reparations for Iraq’s aggression in the 1980 to 1989 Iran-Iraq war.

Substantial questions about the effectiveness of such aircraft remain after 23 years out of service.

The United States has said it will send as many as 300 U.S. advisers to assist the Iraqis and is flying as many as 35 reconnaissance flights over the country daily. Iran also has provided advisers to the Iraqi government and is reported to be flying drones over the country, while the Syrian air force also reportedly has struck ISIS positions inside Iraq.

How the various efforts will be coordinated is uncertain. The Pentagon has said it will not coordinate with Iran.



Read more here: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/06/29/231846/russian-bombers-advisers-arrive.html#storylink=cpy





Read more here: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/06/29/231846/russian-bombers-advisers-arrive.html#storylink=cpy

Blackwater

Before Shooting in Iraq, a Warning on Blackwater
Just weeks before Blackwater guards fatally shot 17 civilians at Baghdad’s Nisour Square in 2007, the State Department began investigating the security contractor’s operations in Iraq. But the inquiry was abandoned after Blackwater’s top manager there issued a threat: “that he could kill” the government’s chief investigator and “no one could or would do anything about it as we were in Iraq,” according to department reports.

American Embassy officials in Baghdad sided with Blackwater rather than the State Department investigators as a dispute over the probe escalated in August 2007, the previously undisclosed documents show. The officials told the investigators that they had disrupted the embassy’s relationship with the security contractor and ordered them to leave the country, according to the reports.

After returning to Washington, the chief investigator wrote a scathing report to State Department officials documenting misconduct by Blackwater employees and warning that lax oversight of the company, which had a contract worth more than $1 billion to protect American diplomats, had created “an environment full of liability and negligence.”

“The management structures in place to manage and monitor our contracts in Iraq have become subservient to the contractors themselves,” the investigator, Jean C. Richter, wrote in an Aug. 31, 2007, memo to State Department officials. “Blackwater contractors saw themselves as above the law,” he said, adding that the “hands off” management resulted in a situation in which “the contractors, instead of Department officials, are in command and in control.”

His memo and other newly disclosed State Department documents make clear that the department was alerted to serious problems involving Blackwater and its government overseers before the Nisour Square shooting, which outraged Iraqis and deepened resentment over the United States’ presence in the country.
Today, as conflict rages again in Iraq, four Blackwater guards involved in the Nisour Square shooting are on trial in Washington on charges stemming from the episode, the government’s second attempt to prosecute the case in an American court after previous charges against five guards were dismissed in 2009.

The shooting was a watershed moment in the American occupation of Iraq, and was a factor in Iraq’s refusal the next year to agree to a treaty allowing United States troops to stay in the country beyond 2011. Despite a series of investigations in the wake of Nisour Square, the back story of what happened with Blackwater and the embassy in Baghdad before the fateful shooting has never been fully told.

The State Department declined to comment on the aborted investigation. A spokesman for Erik Prince, the founder and former chief executive of Blackwater, who sold the company in 2010, said Mr. Prince had never been told about the matter.

After Mr. Prince sold the company, the new owners named it Academi. In early June, it merged with Triple Canopy, one of its rivals for government and commercial contracts to provide private security. The new firm is called Constellis Holdings Experts who were previously unaware of this episode said it fit into a larger pattern of behavior. “The Blackwater-State Department relationship gave new meaning to the word ‘dysfunctional,’ ” said Peter Singer, a strategist at the New America Foundation, a public policy institute, who has written extensively on private security contractors. “It involved everything from catastrophic failures of supervision to shortchanging broader national security goals at the expense of short-term desires.”

Even before Nisour Square, Blackwater’s security guards had acquired a reputation among Iraqis and American military personnel for swagger and recklessness, but their complaints about practices ranging from running cars off the road to shooting wildly in the streets and even killing civilians typically did not result in serious action by the United States or the Iraqi government.

But scrutiny of the company intensified after a Blackwater convoy traveling through Nisour Square on Sept. 16, 2007, just over two weeks after Mr. Richter sent his memo, fired on the crowded traffic circle. A 9-year-old boy was among the civilians killed. Blackwater guards later claimed that they had been fired upon first, but American military officials who inspected the scene determined that there was no evidence of any insurgent activity in the square that day. Federal prosecutors later said Blackwater personnel had shot indiscriminately with automatic weapons, heavy machine guns and grenade launchers.

Founded in 1997 by Mr. Prince, a former member of the Navy SEALs and an heir to an auto parts fortune, Blackwater began as a small company providing shooting ranges and training facilities in rural North Carolina for the military and for police departments. After the American-led invasion of Afghanistan and later Iraq, it ramped up to become a global security contractor with billions of dollars in contracts for the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The company’s gung-ho attitude and willingness to take on risky tasks were seductive to government officials in Washington. The State Department, for example, secretly sent Blackwater guards to Shenyang, China, to provide security for North Korean asylum seekers who had gone to the United States Consulate there and refused to leave for fear the Chinese government would force them to go back to North Korea, according to company documents and interviews with former Blackwater personnel.

But Blackwater’s rapid growth and the State Department’s growing dependence on the contractor led to unbridled hubris, according to several former company officials. That was fostered, they said, by Mr. Prince, who not long before the Nisour Square shooting gathered employees in front of Blackwater headquarters in Moyock, N.C., and demanded that they swear an oath of allegiance.

Saying that the business was on the verge of being awarded lucrative new contracts, Mr. Prince told the workers that they had to take a pledge — the same one required of those entering the United States military — “to display our commitment to the war on terror,” several former employees recalled.

As he was speaking, the employees were handed copies of the oath, which had a Blackwater bear paw logo on top, and told to sign and return it to their supervisors after reciting the words. But some balked.
a private company, and many in the crowd were veterans who believed that it was inappropriately being linked to the company’s commercial prospects.

“It was kind of like pledging allegiance to Erik,” said a former Blackwater employee, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he had been required to sign a nondisclosure agreement with Blackwater. “That’s how a lot of us interpreted it.”

It did not take long for the two-man investigative team — Mr. Richter, a Diplomatic Security special agent, and Donald Thomas Jr., a State Department management analyst — to discover a long list of contract violations by Blackwater.

They found that Blackwater’s staffing of its security details for American diplomats had been changed without State Department approval, reducing guards on many details to eight from 10, the documents said. Blackwater guards were storing automatic weapons and ammunition in their private rooms, where they also were drinking heavily and partying with frequent female visitors. Many of the guards had failed to regularly qualify on their weapons, and were often carrying weapons on which they had never been certified and that they were not authorized to use.

The armored vehicles Blackwater used to protect American diplomats were poorly maintained and deteriorating, and the investigators found that four drunk guards had commandeered one heavily armored, $180,000 vehicle to drive to a private party, and crashed into a concrete barrier.

Blackwater was also overbilling the State Department by manipulating its personnel records, using guards assigned to the State Department contract for other work and falsifying other staffing data on the contract, the investigators concluded.

The investigators concluded that Blackwater was getting away with such conduct because embassy personnel had gotten too close to the contractor.

On Aug. 20, 2007, Mr. Richter was called in to the office of the embassy’s regional security officer, Bob Hanni, who said he had received a call asking him to document Mr. Richter’s “inappropriate behavior.” Mr. Richter quickly called his supervisor in Washington, who instructed him to take Mr. Thomas with him to all remaining meetings in Baghdad, his report noted.

The next day, the two men met with Daniel Carroll, Blackwater’s project manager in Iraq, to discuss the investigation, including a complaint over food quality and sanitary conditions at a cafeteria in Blackwater’s compound. Mr. Carroll barked that Mr. Richter could not tell him what to do about his cafeteria, Mr. Richter’s report said. The Blackwater official went on to threaten the agent and say he would not face any consequences, according to Mr. Richter’s later account.

Mr. Carroll said “that he could kill me at that very moment and no one could or would do anything about it as we were in Iraq,” Mr. Richter wrote in a memo to senior State Department officials in Washington. He noted that Mr. Carroll had formerly served with Navy SEAL Team 6, an elite unit.

“Mr. Carroll’s statement was made in a low, even tone of voice, his head was slightly lowered; his eyes were fixed on mine,” Mr. Richter stated in his memo. “I took Mr. Carroll’s threat seriously. We were in a combat zone where things can happen quite unexpectedly, especially when issues involve potentially negative impacts on a lucrative security contract.”

He added that he was especially alarmed because Mr. Carroll was Blackwater’s leader in Iraq, and “organizations take on the attitudes and mannerisms of their leader.”

Mr. Thomas witnessed the exchange and corroborated Mr. Richter’s version of events in a separate statement, writing that Mr. Carroll’s comments were “unprofessional and threatening in nature.” He added that others in Baghdad had told the two investigators to be “very careful,” considering that their review could jeopardize job security for Blackwater personnel.

Mr. Richter was shocked when embassy officials sided with Mr. Carroll and ordered Mr. Richter and Mr. Thomas to leave Iraq immediately, according to the documents. On Aug. 23, Ricardo Colon, the acting regional security officer at the embassy, wrote in an email that Mr. Richter and Mr. Thomas had become “unsustainably disruptive to day-to-day operations and created an unnecessarily hostile environment for a number of contract personnel.” The two men cut short their inquiry and returned to Washington the next day.
Mr. Richter and Mr. Thomas declined to comment for this article. Mr. Carroll did not respond to a request for comment.

On Oct. 5, 2007, just as the State Department and Blackwater were being rocked by scandal in the aftermath of Nisour Square, State Department officials finally responded to Mr. Richter’s August warning about Blackwater. They took statements from Mr. Richter and Mr. Thomas about their accusations of a threat by Mr. Carroll, but took no further action.

Condoleezza Rice, then the secretary of state, named a special panel to examine the Nisour Square episode and recommend reforms, but the panel never interviewed Mr. Richter or Mr. Thomas.
Patrick Kennedy, the State Department official who led the special panel, told reporters on Oct. 23, 2007, that the panel had not found any communications from the embassy in Baghdad before the Nisour Square shooting that raised concerns about contractor conduct.

Lawrence of Arabia

Bill Moyers Essay: What We Can Learn From Lawrence of Arabia

Lies

The Lies We Believed (And Still Believe) About Iraq
Facts are and must be the coin of the realm in a democracy, for government “of the people, by the people, and for the people,” in Abraham Lincoln’s words, requires an informed citizenry. But in regard to the Iraq War, it seems, facts are now irrelevant or at least debatable, a mere matter of opinion, for a majority of Americans. And if facts no longer matter to millions of our fellow citizens, then what becomes of the traditional role of the journalist as the independent watchdog digging through obfuscation, secrecy and deception by the powerful in search of what Carl Bernstein once called “the best obtainable version of the truth”?

This is a question that touches me personally — not just as a concerned citizen, but as someone who has dedicated his life and work to the pursuit of truth. In more than three decades as an investigative reporter in Washington, DC, my approach toward those in power, regardless of party or ideology, has followed the principle “Watch what they do, not what they say.”

So as a professional truth-seeker, I have always been skeptical of statements by those in power, preferring to ignore the official versions of events in my quest for the (sometimes ugly) underlying realities. That quest continues. But when I learned the extent to which the public had swallowed and accepted the official lies about WMDs in Iraq, I realized that I actually could no longer ignore what those in power had said. Their shameless manipulations and mis-representations, I now saw, were a crucial element in the tragedy of that dubious war of choice, and therefore deserving of investigation and analysis in their own right. Precisely what had US government officials said to cause most Americans and their elected representatives to completely ignore facts, logic, and reason in the rush to war? Exactly who was involved and to what extent?

I began systematically to investigate the answers to those and other related questions, enlisting the help of a team of reporters, researchers and other contributors that ultimately included 25 people. Nearly three years later, the Center for Public Integrity published Iraq: The War Card, a 380,000-word report with an online searchable database. It was released on the eve of the five-year anniversary of the invasion of Iraq and was covered extensively by the national and international news media.

Our report found that in the two years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush and seven of his administration’s top officials made at least 935 false statements about the national security threat posed by Iraq. The carefully orchestrated campaign of untruths about Iraq’s alleged threat to US national security from its WMDs or links to al Qaeda (also specious) galvanized public opinion and led the nation to war under decidedly false pretenses. Perhaps most revealing: the number of false statements made by top Bush administration officials dramatically increased from August 2002 to the time of the critical October 2002 congressional approval of the war resolution and spiked even higher between January and March 2003, between Secretary of State Colin Powell’s address before the United Nations General Assembly and the fateful March 19, 2003, invasion.

The so-called Coalition of the Willing was a face-saving artifice cobbled together after the UN Security Council failed to approve the US-instigated invasion, rendering it a violation of the UN Charter and thus “illegal.” Furthermore, “the intelligence” referred to by Perino proved to be anything but intelligent; indeed, it had been mostly manufactured by the administration in accordance with its political agenda.

Three months after the Center for Public Integrity Iraq report, David Barstow of The New York Times reported more details about how the Iraq deception had been orchestrated. Barstow revealed that the Pentagon had quietly recruited and coached 75 retired military officers to be “independent” paid consultants and radio and television analysts whose true role was to make the case for war in Iraq. Many had significant, undisclosed financial ties to defense companies and were thus benefiting hugely from the very policies they were “analyzing.”

Earlier, Barstow had reported (with colleague Robin Stein) that “at least 20 federal agencies, including the Defense Department and the Census Bureau, have made and distributed hundreds of television news segments between 2001 and 2005 . . . Many were subsequently broadcast on local stations across the country without any acknowledgement of the government’s role in their production.” David Walker, the then comptroller general of the Government Accountability Office, who happened to be a Republican, declared that such taxpayer-paid propaganda by the government is unethical and violates federal law. However, the Bush administration publicly disagreed, and Congress meekly declined to pursue the matter any further.

And a month after the stunning Times stories, one of the White House officials who had actually made several false statements in the lead-up to the Iraq invasion, former press secretary Scott McClellan, wrote a “surprisingly scathing” memoir admitting that his own public comments at White House briefings about Iraq had been “badly misguided,” that President Bush had not been “open and forthright on Iraq,” and that instead he had relied on “propaganda.”

But in the context of the overall performance of the media, these valiant efforts to get beyond the official version to uncover the truth about our involvement in Iraq were too little, too late. The full extent of deference to power and self-censorship by our obsequious major news media during the run-up to war is still not fully known; it will gradually seep out — or not — over the coming years. Some major news organizations later grudgingly acknowledged that their coverage was insufficiently critical of government pronouncements. But that did nothing to ameliorate the tragic consequences of an unnecessary war, including a financial toll of more than $2 trillion, a sum that is likely to increase substantially with benefits to war veterans over time and other expenses, as well as — far more important — the deaths of thousands upon thousands of soldiers and innocent civilians, including women and children.

Did President Bush and other officials from his administration lie about Iraq intentionally and deliberately? It’s hard to tell without unfettered access to the principals and their internal communications. Certainly, we should never underestimate the human capacity for self-delusion — too often, we find it easy to believe what we want to believe. But the fact is that they have avoided the glare of formal scrutiny about their personal responsibility for the litany of repeated, false statements in the run-up to war. Under the Republicans in 2005 and 2006, and the Democrats in 2007 and 2008, there was no congressional investigation into this specific question. Congressional oversight focused almost entirely on the quality of the US government’s pre-war intelligence — not the veracity of the highest-ranking US officials’ public statements or the objectivity and logic of their decision making in instigating the war. Nor in 2009 did the new Democratic president Barack Obama, his administration, or the Democratic Congress evince any interest in investigating this politically sensitive subject. There may be no more telling example of what has happened to congressional oversight in Washington in recent decades.

First Iraq War Was a Pack of Lies

The First Iraq War Was Also Sold to the Public Based on a Pack of Lies

10 Big Fat Lies

10 Big Fat Lies and the Liars Who Told Them

Investigative journalist Chuck Lewis joins Bill this week to discuss his new book, 935 Lies: The Future of Truth and the Decline of America’s Moral Integrity, that looks at the history of government officials and media pundits speaking and repeating (and repeating and repeating) untruths to shape public opinion and policy.


The title of the book refers to the number of times President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and other top administration officials made false statements in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. But the book has a far greater scope, looking at how lies have shaped American policy over several decades.
Here are 10 notable whoppers that affected hundreds, thousands, and in some cases, millions of lives.

1. President Barack Obama on health insurance plans

If you like the [health care] plan you have, you can keep it.”
–President Barack Obama, June 6, 2009 (similarly stated numerous times)

The Affordable Care Act imposed new standards on health care plans, such as a minimum required set of benefits, and limits on total out-of-pocket expenses. A small percentage of existing plans did not meet these standards, and in some cases, the insurance company that had offered them decided to discontinue them. They were, in effect, “canceled.” Though these plans were not very comprehensive, a fraction of the 4-to-5 percent of Americans who had purchased them were upset when they discovered they would not be able to keep them after all. The president’s oft-repeated — and now demonstrably false — claim added fuel to the fire. The administration imposed a temporary “keep your plan” fix to the health care law, and extended it through the midterm elections.

2. President George W. Bush on weapons of mass destruction

“We found the weapons of mass destruction [in Iraq]. We found biological laboratories.”
–President George W. Bush, May 29, 2003

In the run-up to the 2003 US-led coalition invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration offered up many reasons for invading and removing Saddam Hussein from power, but WMDs was the foremost one. The false claim was the primary argument for a war and occupation that claimed the lives of about 5,000 coalition soldiers and nearly a half a million Iraqis.

In April 2005, the CIA closed its investigation into weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, finding nothing.

3. Vice President Dick Cheney on weapons of mass destruction

“Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us.”
–Vice President Dick Cheney, August 26, 2002

Dick Cheney made much of the weapons of mass destruction claim as well as other false statements while he was vice president. And he remains convinced that invading Iraq was justified; last year he told a reporter that even if the US only succeeded in eliminating the potential of WMDs in Iraq, it was worth the war effort.

4. R.J. Reynolds on the health hazards of cigarettes

“Cigarette smoking is no more ‘addictive’ than coffee, tea or Twinkies.”
–James W. Johnston, CEO of RJR Nabisco, April 14, 1994

For over half a century, American cigarette manufacturers denied that their products were addictive and dangerous, and suppressed their own research that confirmed it. The quote comes from written testimony submitted in a 1994 congressional hearing during which executives from the seven largest tobacco companies admitted that there “may be” some health risks to smoking, but denied that cigarettes were addictive, and that they manipulated nicotine levels to make them more so.

A court order compels tobacco companies to apologize in a series of advertisements that will appear in major newspapers and other media if their appeals are rejected.

5. President Ronald Reagan on the Iran-Contra scandal

“In spite of the wildly speculative and false stories of arms for hostages and alleged ransom payments, we did not, repeat, did not, trade weapons or anything else for hostages. Nor will we.”
–President Ronald Reagan, November 13, 1986

The Iran-Contra affair broke when it was revealed that the US government had covertly sold weapons to Iran in spite of an embargo. More illegal still, a portion of the money from the sales was directed to anti-communist rebels in Nicaragua, which Congress had explicitly banned the administration from funding. It remains up for debate how much President Reagan personally knew about the operation, but he had become “frustrated” by a group of Iranian terrorists holding seven Americans hostage in Lebanon, and may have been trying to curry favor with them. In March 1987, he appeared on television and said: “A few months ago I told the American people I did not trade arms for hostages. My heart and my best intentions still tell me that’s true, but the facts and the evidence tell me it is not. As the Tower board reported, what began as a strategic opening to Iran deteriorated, in its implementation, into trading arms for hostages.”

6. The Reagan administration on the the El Mozote massacre

“There is no evidence to confirm that [US-supported El Salvador] government forces systematically massacred civilians in the [El Mozote] operations zone.”
–Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders, February 8, 1982

The US initially denied that the American-supported right-wing government of El Salvador massacred roughly 800 innocent villagers in a counterinsurgency campaign against left-wing guerillas. The massacre was one of the deadliest incidents of the proxy battles the US engaged in throughout the world during the final decades of the Cold War. Enders made the statement above roughly a week after eyewitness accounts of the murders appeared in major American newspapers.

7. President Richard Nixon on the Watergate break-in

“I can say categorically that… no one in the White House staff, no one in this administration, presently employed, was involved in this very bizarre incident.”
–President Richard Nixon, discussing the Watergate burglary, August 29, 1972

In fact, many of Nixon’s top staffers were involved in what would come to be known as the Watergate scandal. In June 1973, former White House counsel John Dean testified that he discussed the Watergate cover-up effort with Nixon at least 35 times. Nixon resigned the following summer. “I deeply regret any injuries that may have been done in the course of the events that led to this decision,” he said.

8. President Richard Nixon on covert operations in Chile

“For us to have intervened [in Chile] – intervened in a free election and to have turned it around – I think would have had repercussions all over Latin America…”
–President Richard Nixon, January 4, 1971

The US was, in fact, carrying out covert operations in Chile, and was providing funding through the CIA to overthrow the newly elected Marxist President Salvadore Allende. Nixon even joked about their semi-successful efforts later in 1971 with Henry Kissinger, a conversation caught on Nixon’s infamous taping system. In 1973, the US-backed anti-government forces would be successful; in a violent coup, General Augusto Pinochet overthrew Allende’s government. Pinochet’s new government killed at least 3,197 people and tortured about 29,000 during a 17-year rule. Nixon was, however, partially correct: American efforts to unseat left-leaning governments and replace them with right-wing dictators did have “repercussions all over Latin America” — and around the world.

9. President Lyndon Johnson on the Vietnam War

“We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves.”
–President Lyndon Johnson, October 1964

In total, 3,403,000 US service members were deployed to Southeast Asia between 1964 and 1975. Roughly 60,000 were killed, and over 150,000 were injured. Millions of Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians also died in the war.

10. Senator Joseph McCarthy on communism

“I have here in my hand a list of 205 [State Department employees] that were known to the secretary of state as being members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping the policy of the State Department.”
–Senator Joseph McCarthy, February 9, 1950

This statement was Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy’s first declaration setting off the phenomenon that would later bare his name, McCarthyism, also known as the second red scare. He would go on to accuse an array of institutions and public figures of being communist sympathizers. His allegations were almost all false.

Drone Debate

Congress Must Speak Up in the Drone Debate

The Lies That Lead to War

BILL MOYERS:There couldn’t be a more timely book than this one -- "935 Lies: The Future of Truth and the Decline of America’s Moral Integrity," by Charles Lewis, one of our premier journalists who has inspired many of us in this craft to aim high and dig deep.

First and foremost an investigative reporter, Chuck Lewis produced some of “60 Minutes” hardest-hitting stories. He left CBS News to found the Center for Public Integrity, one of the largest, nonprofit, investigative reporting publishers in the world. He wrote this "New York Times" bestseller "The Buying of the President 2004" and four other investigative books.

As for his new one, those “935 Lies” in the title were uncovered in a three-year study of the rush to war in Iraq by the Center for Public Integrity and the Fund for Independence in Journalism. It is, Lewis writes, a record of what “…US government officials said to cause most Americans and their elected representatives to completely ignore facts, logic, and reason…”

Timely, too, for another reason: 50 years ago this August, President Lyndon Johnson, at whose side I was then working, seized on obscure and unverified events on the other side of the world to rush Congress into the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, a motion that he turned into a blank check for escalating the war in Vietnam. As Chuck Lewis rightly says, it was “a monumental misrepresentation.” Welcome.

BILL MOYERS: Welcome.

CHARLES LEWIS: It’s great to be here.

BILL MOYERS: Do you think George W. Bush lied about Iraq? Do you think Lyndon Johnson lied about Vietnam?

CHARLES LEWIS: Yes. I do. You know, I've, I tried very hard. You know, in the case of Bush, I actually was trying to give him the benefit of the doubt.

Because if someone believes it, if it's a matter of conviction and they've persuaded themselves of something that's untrue, is that a lie? Or do they just have misguided beliefs that, you know. And I tried to give Bush the benefit of the doubt there.

But over time, each passing year, I've decided that I was way too generous. And the-- I look at flatly: did they make statements that weren't true? The answer is yes. Did they decide they were going to willfully do that over a period of two years? And was it an orchestrated campaign? And it was false statements.

Those were not coincidental. If you look who said what, when. And the when, especially, is quite relevant. This was an orchestrated campaign. Which, of course, Scott McClellan, the press secretary to Bush, publicly essentially said in his memoir after our report, “Iraq: The War Card” came out, by the way, a few months later. So, yeah, I believe in both cases, Lyndon Johnson and George W. Bush, they knew what they were saying was not right. They knew it was not precise or accurate. And they knew it would mislead the American people but also do what they wanted to do. In both cases they had an agenda. That's what I believe.

BILL MOYERS: Well, you've said that we should never underestimate the capacity for self-delusion. Who was it who said that convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies? I mean, they can believe it so completely, be so self-deluded, right? That--

CHARLES LEWIS: Wow, exactly. All the Bush folks. Bush, Cheney. No one has done a candid interview with them where they actually pin their ears to the wall and ask them the tough ques-- I have not seen anyone do that. That's not coincidental. They’ve never been called before Congress. Now what is that about? We used to have this idea of checks and balances. We don’t have any checks and balances.

The Bush administration also destroys tens of millions of emails that no one could see. So, I mean, and no one said anything about it. They had 69 emails accounts that were done through the Republican Party while they were conducting business, knowing that's a private corporation, not part of the United States government.

So, all of this deceit and elaborate efforts to deflect the public from, oh, yeah, the truth, it's pretty outrageous. And we don't-- and so we'll never see some of those emails, ever, I think. And that, to me, is tragic. But, I have enough, I've seen enough now to make a conclusion. Yes, we were absolutely misled, and yes, they did lie. And they, maybe they were lying to themselves. Maybe they actually have come to believe what they're saying. They probably, many of them, some of them, at least, probably do. But they'll never say it on television. And I don't even know if they'll tell their spouses. Who will ever say? I don't know.

BILL MOYERS: Your book traces from the Gulf of Tonkin right on through the Vietnam War. And it traces from the buildup to Iraq to the aftermath of Iraq. And in both cases you clearly outline a pattern of deception that was continued over a long while.

CHARLES LEWIS: It's clear. In both cases those in power knew what they were doing. And those in power had a plan. And those in power orchestrated their plan. And the American people, in both instances, were completely in the dark.

And thousands of lives were lost in both cases. And the fact that we did and it's not a partisan thing. They were two different presidents, two different parties, 40 years apart. But guess what, folks? It was the same basic thing. We wanted to do a war of choice.

BILL MOYERS: When the reports came back from the Gulf of Tonkin, Lyndon Johnson believed them. I know that. I was--

CHARLES LEWIS: Right.

BILL MOYERS: --right there by the tragedy is he acted before they could be verified and before--

CHARLES LEWIS: Right.

BILL MOYERS: --he could get it right. And then he started telling himself that he did the right thing even though the initial information was misleading. And the more he told himself that he was doing the right thing, because there was this danger out here, and that he used it to get the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed, he then felt he had to keep telling it.

CHARLES LEWIS: Wow. Yeah.

BILL MOYERS: Pretty soon--

CHARLES LEWIS: Then you're a prisoner to your statements.

BILL MOYERS: Yeah.

CHARLES LEWIS: I understand that dynamic.

BILL MOYERS: What have you learned about how Washington goes to war?

CHARLES LEWIS: What I learned is that it's orchestrated. They frame it in a way that’s palatable to the largest possible audience. And they'll say it many, many, many times. That's the most recent way to do it.

BILL MOYERS: Why is the press so complicit in helping them frame it?

CHARLES LEWIS: Well, they basically do the stenography of listening to whatever those in power say and reporting it. They see their first duty wrongly, I think, to just report what's said with very little analysis or critical commentary. And they've been doing that, actually, for a very long time. But they've done it. It's gotten worse over time.

The Washington press corps is a prisoner of what they're assigned to cover. And that's basically whatever officialdom tells them.

But if you say something several times, hundreds of times; there are scientific studies that show we will tend to believe it if we've heard it a lot, even if we actually are not clear at all whether it's true. We just come to assume it's true, why otherwise we wouldn't be hearing this, right? And so we're basically prisoners of whatever folks tell us who are in power.

The problem now is government has more PR people and public relations firms than journalists. And we actually have 1/3 fewer professional reporters. That's a really rotten combination there. No wonder we're easily bamboozled.

BILL MOYERS: So for the last two weeks you could hardly turn on the television set without seeing the architects and the cheerleaders of the invasion of Iraq 11 years ago being asked their opinion now of what the US should do in Iraq.

So there was ABC's Jonathan Karl just the other day turning to Dick Cheney and asking, "What would you do in Iraq?" There wasn't a bit of irony in his voice or in his eyes.

CHARLES LEWIS: Well, it's an abomination. There's a moral problem here. They're not telling the full truth. And they're presenting themselves, the media, a false image. But I know, as a veteran from the networks, actually, I know exactly what that dynamic is. And you are rewarded for the gets you have. The people you-- big names that—

BILL MOYERS: The interview you get. Yeah, the--

CHARLES LEWIS: Right. And if you rip them to shreds, guess what, they're not going to come on your show. I've noticed that, as Mike Wallace's producer.

BILL MOYERS: You've lived in Washington how long now?

CHARLES LEWIS: Boy, wow, it's really scary; 40 years.

BILL MOYERS: So what did you learn in doing this book over the last nine years that you didn't know?

CHARLES LEWIS: Well, it's possible I was in danger of becoming cynical before. But I have to say the extent of the lies. I actually didn't realize the pervasiveness. I just thought that occasionally some turkey would lie. I mean, and but the, it was the extent of this. This is a systemic problem we have here. We have an inability to get the truth in real time. And the media has complete inability to find out the truth in real time. And when it's right in front of their face, they don't always report it. And so we really have a problem here because if we don't know what the truth is in this country, we don't have a country. It's end of story. It's not our country anymore. This is fundamental. And if the public doesn't care about facts then journalists, frankly, are not terribly relevant either. I had a professional crisis. Like, why am I doing this if no one cares and false information is what they believe, not the actual information?

BILL MOYERS: You know James Risen, "The New York Times" reporter, right?

CHARLES LEWIS: Uh-huh.

BILL MOYERS: He has refused to testify before a grand jury, under subpoena, and reveal a confidential source of information in his book, "State of War," about the secret US campaign against the Iranian nuclear program. The Supreme Court has refused to hear his case. And Risen now says he will go to jail if necessary. What are the stakes in this case?

CHARLES LEWIS: Well, they're very high. I mean, there's very-- they're very high for Jim in particular, obviously. He could end up in prison, found in contempt by a judge for not testifying, not answering some questions the government asks. If it gets to that point. There is a chance that the US Justice Department will choose to not proceed at this point. There's been at least some indication that's possible. I don't know that it'll happen. I'm certainly hoping that happens. But there's a dirty little secret about national security reporting. There's only about 15 or so people that do that full-time in the United States. In a country of 300-plus million people, only 15 or so do it for a full-time job. And Jim Risen happens to be one. And as you know he's the one who co-authored the domestic surveillance stories that won the Pulitzer back in '05.

Today the dirty little secret in Washington is that we have thousands of cameras. Every cell phone has a GPS tracking device. And you also can't check into any government agency and sign in to get into meet with someone because the government has that information, and they'll know who came.

And if you call them, their calls are potentially monitored. And there is a general belief widely shared that your emails are scraped, or at least accessed. And I know journalists who've been told privately by folks in the NSA and elsewhere that that's basically not untrue. And so you have a situation here. They know who his source was.

BILL MOYERS: They do?

CHARLES LEWIS: They do. And they have multiple ways in which they've identified who it is. And that's why they brought a case and they have enough evidence that they hope and they think to convict this person. They've already--

BILL MOYERS: They want to convict the source.

CHARLES LEWIS: They want to convict the source. And they want to have Jim Risen be the one who helps them do it. But they don't want to necessarily betray their intelligence ways that they found out that may or may, they may be legal, because they're government employees, but they're going to appear to be unseemly because they involved monitoring of employees and pulling all kinds of things.

So we have a little-- another strange thing going on here where the government doesn't really want to go anywhere near this subject. And so they would like-- so we're all looking at Jim Risen and whether he goes to prison. And the real issue is actually the government. What are they mad about? Well, he did a story and a chapter in his book, “State of War,” that actually showed that the CIA sent nuclear information to Iran. Oops. And they are livid.

BILL MOYERS: Something we might want to know about.

CHARLES LEWIS: Yep. Yeah, yeah. Exactly.

BILL MOYERS: Right? Might want to know that the government responsible to the people was actually making these serious mistakes?

CHARLES LEWIS: Yeah. It's unbelievable that they were doing that. And it's unbelievable. And so Risen breaks that story in the book. And they are mad that he did this. And they, frankly, embarrassed them. And so they're trying-- this is retribution. I think it has very little to do with anything but retribution.

But I also think what is really disturbing now is the difficulty of doing this type of reporting was never easy. Now it is probably more difficult than it's ever been in US history. And President Obama has used the Espionage Act against journalists more than any president in US history.

BILL MOYERS: I think even Nixon only used it once against--

CHARLES LEWIS: Right.

BILL MOYERS: --Daniel Ellsberg who leaked the Pentagon Papers. And Obama's used it how many--?

CHARLES LEWIS: Eight times. It's unbelievable. And--

BILL MOYERS: The Espionage Act.

CHARLES LEWIS: Right, the Espionage Act. And who would've ever imagined that? This is something Obama never talked about in campaigns. He never publicly said he was going to go do this. And like a lot of things in his administration, he's trying to have it both ways.

He's supporting a shield law, to some extent, in Congress for journalists. But on the other hand he's criminalizing investigative reporting by going after sources. And so he's throwing a bone, or being accommodating to the national security establishment in Washington, which, you know, in just a couple-year period did 76 million classified documents. Far more than any time in US history. And so he's a prisoner to that community to a large extent. And this is a fellow who didn't know anything about foreign policy. Was a state legislator in Illinois and was a one-term senator. And suddenly he's become more hawkish against reporters than George W. Bush. I don’t know anyone who saw that coming.

BILL MOYERS: What does he know we don't know about?

CHARLES LEWIS: That is really a peculiar thing. And it's not been adequately ventilated. And journalists haven't asked Obama directly the few times they had direct access.

BILL MOYERS: So what's at stake if we do silence and punish whistleblowers?

CHARLES LEWIS: Well, what's at stake is whistleblowers won't come forward. They know they're going to be prosecuted. They know they're being monitored. A lot of sources have dried up. There have been some panels in the last year, too, in the journalistic realm. And folks have talked about how it's harder to find people to talk now because they fear retribution.

They know that the surveillance has gotten incredibly intense. And the stakes are incredibly high. And they get that. And so a lot of folks are who might be inclined to leak and leakers are wonderful. Because they tell reporters what they don't already have and they can't find in any document. They're very essential.

BILL MOYERS: If Edward Snowden had offered you the NSA documents, would you have published them?

CHARLES LEWIS: I would've liked to. He didn't call.

BILL MOYERS: But if he had?

CHARLES LEWIS: I would. I would have. You know, when I ran the Center for Public Integrity, we posted the Patriot Two Act. We were told by the top aide to the attorney general, "Don't do it. You will be sorry if you do." And we quoted them by name in our article and we posted within minutes.

BILL MOYERS: For my younger viewers, what's the Patriot Two Act?

CHARLES LEWIS: The Patriot-- it was called the Patriot Two Act, the Domestic Enhancement Security Act of 2003, to be precise. And they were introducing it just days before the invasion of Iraq, perhaps hoping no one would notice. It took the Patriot Act, which substantially limited civil liberties for large number of Americans and in general, upped the ante about security in America and it took it to a whole another place.

CHARLES LEWIS: The Patriot Two Act was far more restrictive.

BILL MOYERS: When you released this document against the wishes of the government, were there any personal repercussions to you and your organization?

CHARLES LEWIS: There weren't any repercussions from that. But I, you know, I had other things happen. We were sued by Russian billionaire oligarchs for a story we did about Dick Cheney and Halliburton and their business activities in Siberia. That suit went on for five years. It was dismissed.

But, you know, generally, we're not this is a fortunate country in that sense. We don't generally kill journalists or even beat them up, unlike other countries.

BILL MOYERS: Can democracy die of too many lies?

CHARLES LEWIS: I don't think there's any question about it. You're usually the one who quotes scripture. But my only thing I could ever quote, I may not even have it perfectly right, but from Proverbs. "When there is no vision, the people perish." That happens to be one of the all-time, most interesting statements I've ever heard.

And I think if you don't know what's going to happen and you don't know what is happening, how are you going to embrace any problem of our time with any seriousness? If all you're ever doing are two parties fighting over everything and everything is debatable, and you can never reach a consensus on any single thing, and you don't even have common goals anymore, what are we here?

Starting to wonder. And so I actually-- it goes pretty deep here. I think this is so fundamental. And I don't-- I think the only thing we have that we can learn is I do believe that old saw, information is power. I think if we learn what the truth is, we find out what is actually happening, and we have the facts, we can act on them. But there are still many Americans who won't. I reconcile that, myself to that. But there are a lot of Americans who need to frankly, start paying attention.

BILL MOYERS: The book is “935 Lies: The Future of Truth and the Decline of America's Moral Integrity.” Chuck Lewis, thanks for being with me.

CHARLES LEWIS: Thanks for having me.

NGC 5128

What's happened to the center of this galaxy? Unusual and dramatic dust lanes run across the center of elliptical galaxy Centaurus A. These dust lanes are so thick they almost completely obscure the galaxy's center in visible light. This is particularly unusual as Cen A's red stars and round shape are characteristic of a giant elliptical galaxy, a galaxy type usually low in dark dust. Cen A, also known as NGC 5128, is also unusual compared to an average elliptical galaxy because it contains a higher proportion of young blue stars and is a very strong source of radio emission. Evidence indicates that Cen A is likely the result of the collision of two normal galaxies. During the collision, many young stars were formed, butdetails of the creation of Cen A's unusual dust belts are still being researched. Cen A lies only 13 million light years away, making it the closest active galaxy. Cen A, pictured above, spans 60,000 light years and can be seen with binoculars toward the constellation of Centaurus.

Julia Pfeiffer Burns State Park and Milky Way

To see a vista like this takes patience, hiking, and a camera.Patience was needed in searching out just the right place and waiting for just the right time. A short hike was needed to reach this rugged perch above a secluded cove in Julia Pfeiffer Burns State Park in California, USA. And a camera was needed for the long exposure required to bring out the faint light from stars and nebulae in the background Milky Way galaxy.Moonlight illuminated the hidden beach and inlet behind nearby trees in the above composite image taken last month. Usually obscured McWay Falls is visible just below the image center, while the Pacific Ocean is in view to its right. The above image is a high-resolution sequel to a similar image that appeared last year.