War Game

Russia Attacks a NATO Country in a War Game. It Doesn’t End Well.

In a simulation where Russia breaches the Lithuanian border, Europe struggles to respond without U.S. help.

By Carolina Drüten

Imagine Ukraine is forced into a peace deal later this year. In the aftermath, Russian troops conduct military exercises in neighboring Belarus, then stay put, massed along the Lithuanian border despite Moscow’s assurances that they would be pulling out.

A video begins circulating online, later identified as fake. It appears to show German soldiers stationed in Lithuania abusing Russian-speaking teenagers. Soon after, a cyberattack hits Germany’s savings banks, knocking large numbers of ATMs offline. In Vilnius, Lithuania’s government issues a warning: Russian troops could cross the border to the NATO country, a move that would test the alliance to its core.

And what if the United States hesitated?

Many security experts believe such a scenario is plausible, particularly as President Donald Trump signals that Europe must shoulder more of its own defense and as Russia seems intent on re-establishing itself as Europe’s dominant power.

But is Germany — the EU’s largest country and NATO’s logistical backbone — ready to take on that burden? How would Germany and its allies actually respond if Russia pushed beyond Ukraine and attacked a NATO member?

To answer those questions, WELT collaborated with the German Wargaming Center of the Helmut-Schmidt-University of the German Armed Forces to conduct an all-day war game on Dec. 1, 2025. We gathered retired military leaders, former top international officials, diplomats and security experts and asked them to play the roles of top decision-makers in Germany, NATO, Russia and the U.S. as they confront the cascade of decisions that kind of crisis would set off. (Like POLITICO, WELT is owned by Axel Springer.)

Their task: respond to a hypothetical crisis that would be NATO’s gravest challenge to date, use “what-if” scenarios to test strategies, identify red lines and expose weaknesses. The action would take place over three fictional days, the early start of what could develop into a continental conflict. Each decision carries consequences, prompting the opposing side to adjust its next move — with potentially catastrophic ramifications.

The set: two classrooms at Bundeswehr University in Hamburg. The “Blue Team,” representing Germany’s federal government, is camped out in one room. Across the hall is the “Red Team” representing the Russian president, foreign minister and military chief as they plot NATO’s defeat.

In each room, the players keep their eyes glued on a giant TV screen where, with the aid of AI, the initial action plays out in the form of short videos and a mock news show. During the course of the war game, the teams are kept apprised of the other team’s actions with written text that flashes on the screen. (An international group, including Longescu and Rathke, participate remotely from Brussels, Warsaw and Washington, keeping track of the action via a WhatsApp group text.)

The teams cannot hear one another. But they are informed of each other’s moves — broadcast on the large screens — as the simulation unfolds.

The war game begins.

Day One

Berlin

Dawn breaks over Berlin’s government district. Lights are on in the Chancellery. Reports from Vilnius, Warsaw and Brussels have been coming in for hours. Lithuania has warned that Russian troops are massed along the Belarusian border, in combat formation. As ministers and advisers take their seats, the chancellor opens the crisis meeting. “We have a shared objective,” he says. “To push back against Russia, support our allies, and make clear that Germany is ready to play an active role.” (In real life today, 1,800 soldiers are part of the German brigade on the ground in Lithuania as part of NATO’s forward presence. Of those, 500 are part of a multinational battlegroup.)

Militarily, the Kremlin is ready for an attack. The big question is about intent, and whether the Russian president has given the order to invade. What does he want to achieve? The Blue Team does not yet ask itself this question.

That omission will prove costly.

Instead, the German government focuses first on preparing the state for the crisis. The head of the Federal Office of Civil Protection urges immediate action: activating civil emergency plans; convening administrative crisis staff; alerting on-call units; and switching warning systems to high readiness. The government also convenes the National Security Council, bringing in state governments and key private-sector actors. At the chancellor’s instruction, uniformed soldiers, police officers and civil protection teams increase their visible presence on the streets.

Moscow

“We want to fracture NATO’s unity,” the Russian president says.

“Ultimately, this isn’t about the Baltic states,” his military chief adds, “but about establishing a security architecture in Europe that aligns more closely with our interests than the one that exists today.”

This mirrors the logic of Russia’s real leadership. The Kremlin seeks to roll back Europe’s security order to its 1997 configuration — before Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and the Baltic states joined NATO. Shortly before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin laid out three demands: no further NATO expansion; no U.S. strike weapons near Russia’s borders; and a rollback of NATO forces and infrastructure to their 1997 positions. In such a European order, Russia would decide the fate of smaller states.

In the war game, Team Russia adopts this mindset. It manufactures a humanitarian emergency in Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea. Moscow demands what it calls a humanitarian convoy from Belarus to Kaliningrad through Lithuania — officially to deliver food and medicine. Vilnius rightly sees it as a pretext for an attack.

The Russians discuss several possible strategies. “One option,” the military chief says, “purely from a geographical standpoint, would indeed be a corridor running along the railway line and the main east–west transport routes through Lithuania.”

He is describing an advance straight through the heart of Lithuania. From the Belarusian border to the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius, it is only about 30 kilometers. The roads there are well developed. Military vehicles would be able to move quickly. “The major drawback,” the senior officer says, “is the significant risk of escalation from a military perspective.”

Lithuania’s main artery would fall under Russian control. Vilnius would lie within range of Russian forces. If Kremlin troops were to advance, they would, with high probability, encounter the German brigade, which is stationed south of the capital, the military chief warns. That would run counter to Russia’s objective of creating facts on the ground without triggering major escalation. NATO’s mutual defense clause treats an attack against one Alliance member as an attack against all. If invoked, a huge military machine could be set in motion with prepared plans and a joint command. Avoiding the activation of Article 5, Team Russia agrees, is paramount.

Instead, the military chief points to the Suwałki Gap: a 65-kilometer strip of land between Poland and Lithuania, bordered by Kaliningrad to the west and Belarus to the east. It is NATO’s only land connection to the Baltic states, and it lies farther away from the Lithuanian capital. It’s a bottleneck. Sever it, and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are cut off.

The Russian foreign minister wants to know whether Germany’s brigade in Lithuania might still get in the way of the Kremlin’s troops. The Russian military chief waves it off; the brigade, he says, hasn’t yet reached full combat strength. “There isn’t enough air and missile defense,” he says. In other words: Moscow does not expect the German brigade to stop it.

Berlin

From Berlin’s perspective, the timing is bad. Germany’s brigade in Lithuania is still being built up; it is not scheduled to reach full strength until 2027. Ultimately, it will comprise around 5,000 soldiers and consist of three combat units: two German units and one NATO unit. Similar brigades are also stationed in Latvia and Estonia. Even at full strength, such brigades are meant to be tripwires, not war-winning forces. Their purpose is to ensure any attack immediately entangles the entire alliance. Their mere presence is intended to deter Russia from trying something.

Nevertheless, the Bundeswehr wants to appear ready for a fight. “We can run a campaign called ‘increased training activities in Lithuania,’” suggests the Inspector General of the German Armed Forces, the highest-ranking soldier in Germany. German troops, he suggests, should travel to Lithuania for exercises — by ship and overland through Poland, via the Suwałki Gap. (In real life, this would take weeks to accomplish.) The navy is also mobilized. Warships depart German ports, a process that would take several days in real life. Germany has three “gray giants” equipped with radar to monitor the skies and intercept hostile aircraft, missiles or drones. The government also orders the intelligence services to step up collection: Russia should not be able to take a single step unseen. Poland and Lithuania begin reinforcing their positions around the Suwałki Gap.

Moscow

The men in the Kremlin watch Germany’s moves closely.

“They don’t expect anything from what we’re going to do,” the president says.

“Your respect for the Germans used to be greater, Mr. President,” the foreign minister replies.

“Yes. Back then. Ancient history.”

The foreign minister argues that Germany has often been caught off guard by Russian offensives in the past. Now, NATO could be standing on the edge of a major war — and Berlin is responding in small, incremental steps. “They’ve learned nothing,” he says. “It’s astonishing.”

Still, something gives the three Russians pause. Germany has decided to deploy air-defense ships to the Baltic Sea and send additional troops to Lithuania. At the same time, Vilnius and Warsaw move to reinforce their forces along the Suwałki Gap. The military chief estimates the buildup will take two to three days.

“We would need to act quickly,” he says.

And they do.

Day Two

Southern Lithuania

The Kremlin’s operation resembles a pincer movement: Russian soldiers advance across the border from Belarus into Lithuania a few hours after midnight. At the same time, troops in Kaliningrad cross the border from the other side, securing a land corridor north of the Suwalki Gap but below the major transit corridor. In less than 24 hours, the two thrusts meet in a strategically vital city: Marijampolė, where key transportation routes converge.

Moscow calls its forces “peacekeepers,” supposedly tasked with protecting a humanitarian convoy they are sending to Kaliningrad. In reality, it’s a heavy armored force. The Lithuanians had begun digging anti-tank trenches and laying mines in the border areas near Kaliningrad and Belarus to prevent troops from coming in. But the country is small — three million people, and no fighter jets of its own. They are not prepared for an assault of this scale and speed. They are overwhelmed.

Russia’s troops now control the only land link between the Baltic states and the rest of NATO territory. Around it, they create a lethal exclusion zone — mines, rocket artillery, drones and air defenses — designed to keep anyone from pushing them off the ground they have seized.

Russia has invaded a NATO country.

Berlin

The chancellor and his ministers have learned of the Kremlin’s incursion. “This implies we must move beyond consultations and address the issue of mutual defense,” says the defense minister. A NATO response requires the unanimous approval of all member states, and from a European perspective, it’s the U.S. which has become an uncertain ally in recent years. The foreign minister urges the chancellor to speak with their American allies immediately.

Moscow

The Kremlin, too, decides to reach out to the Americans. “We have to aim to decouple America and Europe in this critical hour,” the foreign minister says. The military chief adds: “Bilaterally, I would emphasize above all that we see the United States as a mediator, and not as an instrumental part of NATO.” Moscow wants a deal with Washington. Ideally, they would work things out at a major summit bringing the two presidents together. “The agenda would, of course, include a new peace architecture in Europe,” the Russian president says, “as well as the bilateral economic relationship.”

The U.S. secretary of state is willing to listen to what the Kremlin has to say.

The Russian president picks up the phone. “Hi, Mr. Secretary.”

“This is the president speaking, yes?”

“Yes,” replies the Russian president. “I decided to call myself because of the gravity of the situation.”

“There is an extreme worry about the presence of your troops in Lithuania,” says the secretary of state. “It’s something that we can’t ignore.”

What matters most in the exchange is what the secretary of state does not do: He draws no red lines. He does not demand an immediate withdrawal.

He does not threaten consequences.

Washington, D.C.

How the United States would respond in such a crisis in the real world has grown increasingly hard to predict. For years, Washington has prodded Europe to shoulder the burden of its own defense. Under Trump, that posture has sharpened.

The National Security Strategy of November 2025 states that the era of the United States acting as the sole guarantor of the global order is over. The document then ranks America’s strategic priorities. First comes the Western Hemisphere. Second is Asia, which primarily refers to China and the Indo-Pacific. Europe comes in a distant third.

In the war game, the American secretary of state becomes the intermediary Russia wants, staying in touch with both sides — speaking not only with the Russian president, but also with the German chancellor and foreign minister in a confidential video call. The Polish prime minister and the NATO secretary-general join the call as well.

In Washington, the overriding goal is to avoid being pulled into another war in Europe. “People are raising all sorts of concerns about whether the United States is going to get wrapped up in a conflict that frankly we thought had been addressed several months ago,” the secretary says on the confidential call, referring to the war in Ukraine.

His German counterpart, the foreign minister, pushes back. “It’s crystal clear we are under attack!” The Polish prime minister backs him up: “Peace can only be preserved through strength.” This is a concern shared by the NATO Secretary General. “From what I understand, a lot of American troops, at least in eastern Europe, may not be available as they are on standby to be redeployed to the Western Hemisphere at a yet unclear time,” she says. In real life, around 2,000 U.S. troops are currently stationed in the Baltics. But even though Trump has pledged to keep them there — for now — their support isn’t guaranteed in a crisis, given that Washington is reviewing its global force posture.

The American position is blunt. “We don’t want to do anything that might call into question the work that has been done to create a broader basis for a constructive relationship with Russia, including economically,” the secretary says. Washington rejects new sanctions on Russia. And it refuses even to discuss Article 5. In effect, NATO is paralyzed.

The call ends.

Day Three

Moscow

Russia begins to press its advantage. Next, the Kremlin discusses how to disable Germany, arguably one of the most powerful of the European members of the alliance. The Russian planning assumes NATO comes to Lithuania’s defense in force — meaning hundreds of thousands of allied troops would transit through Germany on their way to the front. From Moscow’s perspective, knocking out that logistics spine would be crucial.

“With Germany, it’s best to stick to the proven strategy: carrot and stick,” the foreign minister says. The stick: a strike plan against German territory. “I would conduct precision strikes on rail infrastructure and on the port of Bremerhaven, the key entry point for heavy U.S. equipment,” he says. He also mentions attacks on LNG terminals at Wilhelmshaven and Lubmin, major rail junctions, offshore wind farms in the North Sea to disrupt the power supply and drone strikes on industrial hubs.

It’s a saturation strategy — one Germany would have little military answer for. “German air and missile defense is very limited,” the military chief says. “They have almost no capability to defend against drones.”

For now, though, the stick stays in the drawer. Instead, Moscow reaches for the carrot: economic cooperation and energy imports. Russia has already been courting Germany since the summer of 2026 with long-term gas contracts discounted by up to 20 percent and investment promises for eastern German industry. It targets actors in eastern German states and selected representatives from parties that are known to have sympathies toward Russia in the past and present.

Berlin

No one around the table has any appetite for Moscow’s carrot. On the contrary: The chancellor and his ministers decide to tighten the economic screws. Russian businesspeople are denied visas. Berlin ends its remaining energy ties to Russia, pressures France to follow suit, and pushes to use any Russian assets held in Europe that were frozen in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The government also moves to crack down on Russia’s “shadow fleet”— aging oil tankers used to evade Western sanctions. The ships often sail uninsured, switch off tracking transponders and repeatedly appear near sites where undersea cables have been damaged. Berlin decides to shut that down. In Germany’s exclusive economic zone near the North and Baltic Seas, Russian oil tankers are stopped, inspected and turned back. If other Baltic states join — Poland, the Baltic countries, Finland — a tight net would form.

And then comes a step no German government has ever taken in real life. The defense minister argues it’s time to declare the Spannungsfall — a constitutional emergency in which an armed attack on Germany is considered likely. It triggers a package of laws and measures designed to prepare the country for war.

“We may need to start preparing hospitals,” the head of the Federal Office of Civil Protection says. “That takes time.” Declaring the Spannungsfall eases the logistical burden. It could also allow the government to direct industry to prioritize production for the armed forces. Although the parliamentary hurdle is high — two-thirds of the Bundestag must approve it — the step succeeds.

As a consequence, all adult men in Germany are now subject to conscription.

Moscow

The men in the Kremlin remain unimpressed.

“Interestingly, not a single point here involves activating additional NATO troops,” says the military chief.

“Maybe the purpose is to show they’re doing something, sending strong signals,” says the president. “But it doesn’t solve their actual problem.”

The military chief puts it bluntly: “We have, in effect, attacked a NATO country. And there’s been no strong reaction from Germany.”

However, the planned actions against the shadow fleet are angering Moscow. So the Kremlin decides to raise the stakes. From now on, warships will accompany the tankers in the Baltic Sea. Any inspection by NATO countries could thus lead to a direct military confrontation.

Berlin

The Germans immediately grasp what that means.

The chancellor asks: “Are we prepared to stop those ships anyway?”

“I think we are,” replies the defense minister. “If we roll back now, it’s a full retreat.”

The chancellor thinks aloud: What if a ship in the shadow fleet refuses to be inspected? What if the Russian navy intervenes? “What do we do then? Just report it and pull back?”

“It depends on the local balance of forces,” says the defense minister. “Reporting alone won’t cut it.”

“Then we need to look each other in the eye,” says the chancellor. “Because that means, in the end, firing live rounds.”

The debate exposes something deeper: For decades, Germany could assume the United States would cover the final rung of any escalation. Now Berlin is weighing decisions that, at worst, could trigger a shooting war — without American backup.

Southern Lithuania

Wars aren’t fought only on battlefields, but in people’s minds. Russia’s “humanitarian convoy” begins driving through the occupied corridor across Lithuanian territory to Kaliningrad. Trucks — loaded, Moscow claims, with food and medicine — roll bumper to bumper. The Russian Red Cross is on board. The organization is internationally regarded as closely aligned with Russia’s state and military interests. Russian TV crews film interviews. Soldiers secure the route, but the Russian cameras linger on civilians, especially women, declaring how grateful they are for the help from the Russians.

Berlin

Germany’s interior minister worries the Russian narrative is taking hold. “We urgently need our own narrative,” she says. “Above all, we must consistently dismantle what Russia is doing, how it’s presenting it, and make clear that it’s false.”

To regain control of the story, the government launches a sweeping communications campaign that’s distributed on social media and in news outlets that calls Russia a threat to world peace.

The cabinet then turns to the question of what Germany can do militarily. Legally, the German army could fight in Lithuania and assist the attacked country even without NATO invoking Article 5. International law recognizes both individual and collective self-defense. Germany’s constitution allows such a deployment as well. Parliament would need to approve it — but if danger is imminent, approval could come after the fact.

The real sticking point is political: Under what framework would Germany fight? Alone? In a European coalition? Or only if NATO acts as one?

The German leaders decide Berlin does not want to fight alone. A loose “coalition of the willing” feels politically too thin. The defense minister points to a European alternative: the EU’s mutual-assistance clause, Article 42(7). It has been invoked only once, in 2015, after the Paris terror attacks.

The chancellor and foreign minister call Brussels and consult the president of the European Commission. “This clause doesn’t create an automatic military response,” he says. “But it does obligate concrete and effective assistance. This can be intelligence, military, political or economic.”

The attacked country decides whether to invoke it. The German cabinet decides: If Lithuania requests it, Germany, together with France and Poland, will push for a European mutual-assistance response. The Blue Team is preparing for a conflict in Europe — without America.

Moscow

“We have to undermine this German initiative,” the Russian foreign minister says. “Now we need to activate Hungary. And Slovakia. Maybe the Czech Republic too.” The Red Team begins leaning on the three countries as what they call “friends of peace.” They are hoping they will put up roadblocks on Russia’s behalf both in the EU and NATO.

Brussels

NATO’s secretary-general is not giving up yet. She has a plan for how the alliance could respond without formally invoking Article 5, which requires a bit of a sleight of hand: activate the regional defense plans for the Baltics and Central Europe. They are highly classified, but the broad outlines are known: NATO’s supreme allied commander in Europe, SACEUR, would gain broader authority to request and move forces. That requires consensus among allies, but not a formal vote of all members.

It’s not Article 5, in other words, but the U.S. must still be on board.

Washington, D.C.

To Berlin’s surprise, the U.S. secretary of state does not immediately reject the proposal. But he attaches conditions: First, Europeans must provide all necessary troops. Second, all NATO members must agree, which is far from guaranteed with countries like Hungary, Turkey or Slovakia. And third, the United States does not want a direct military confrontation with Russia.

Europe, however, cannot implement NATO’s defense plans alone. The U.S. provides many of the essential capabilities: air and missile defense systems; real-time intelligence; targeting; and the ability to strike militarily significant targets — precision strikes against Russia. That is where Washington draws the line at this moment. The U.S. is willing to keep NATO’s command structure running and provide intelligence. But American troops would not move east, and U.S. aircraft would not hit Russian targets.

Warsaw

Poland’s prime minister wants to test Russia: Will it actually enforce its claim over the corridor by force? It is not far from Poland’s border with Lithuania. He proposes sending humanitarian transport planes into Lithuania, escorted by NATO fighter jets. Moscow would be informed of the routes in advance. The burden of escalation would then fall on Russia. Poland is ready to contribute if the mission is approved collectively by the Alliance.

Berlin

Germany’s government, meanwhile, is busy translating the Spannungsfall into practical steps, conscription included. The defense minister orders reservists into refresher training. However, one fundamental question has not yet been asked. The interior minister says it out loud: “Can anyone at this table assess what the Russians actually want? What is their objective?”

“To make the Baltics Russian,” replies the chancellor.

“I’d say, to demonstrate NATO and the EU are incapable of acting,” counters the defense minister.

“And then,” says the chancellor, “to make the Baltics Russian.”

Southern Lithuania

It’s now been 48 hours since Russian forces moved into Lithuania. Russia continues to fortify the corridor. Defensive positions are being built in layers: soldiers dig in; carve trenches; lay additional minefields and pour concrete bunkers. Artillery is moved into place, tanks are buried, air and missile defenses reinforced. A counterstrike would now come at a higher price. With every new position, the balance shifts. The burden of escalation increasingly rests with NATO. To defend its own territory, the alliance would have to strike the Russian corridor.

Moscow

The foreign minister says at this point he can’t imagine NATO will choose to retaliate. “An extremely difficult decision,” he says, “one that would mean many dead.” Yet the Kremlin keeps one final escalation step in mind. It is never stated outright, but it is always present: nuclear threats. Whether Moscow would actually take that step, or merely threaten it, remains an open question.

Berlin

“This is a continuation of the aggression,” the defense minister says when he is briefed on the expansion of the Russian military corridor. “Strictly speaking, it could justify an attack. But we shouldn’t do them that favor.” Still, Berlin feels compelled to respond. Every hour that passes works to the advantage of the Russian army, allowing it to further harden its positions in Lithuania.

Lithuania, too, no longer wants to wait for NATO. Vilnius activates the European Union mutual defense clause. The inspector general of the German Armed Forces puts forward a proposal for immediate German support: the European Rapid Deployment Capacity, a European force of up to 5,000 troops. Berlin wants to position it around the Russian corridor — to prevent Kremlin forces from breaking out and seizing additional territory — and assumes command and operational planning.

The European force was never designed for territorial defense. Its mandate is evacuations, stabilization missions, surveillance. But for now, it is better than nothing.

It is the final decision the Blue Team makes in the war game. They’re out of time.

The exercise draws to a close. Russia has its land corridor. NATO hasn’t taken action in response to the seizure of territory of an alliance member. And Germany and other European countries are mustering a small force — without American participation — to challenge the Russian occupation on their own.

Hamburg

Back to reality. At the Bundeswehr University, it is now late afternoon. Soldiers jog across the sports field in front of the cafeteria. It is not October 2026. Russia has not invaded Lithuania.

In the war game, the teams had been seated at the table since early morning. They made phone calls, argued, weighed options. The Red Team grew increasingly frustrated during the simulation by the inadequate European response. Alexander Gabuev, who played the Russian president, said after the simulation on X that it was “one of the most depressing experiences in my professional career so far.” From their perspective, Germany’s response in particular fell far short of what would have been required to halt the Russian advance. “We are well prepared to respond to any threats against the alliance,” NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said on Feb. 11 when asked about WELT’s war game. If anyone attacks a NATO country, he vowed, “our reaction will be devastating.”

The Blue Team, by contrast, had focused on preparing the state for crisis, coordinating with partners and scrutinizing how every move would play externally. Germany acted according to its own logic — and thought too little from the adversary’s point of view.

“Blue achieved far more than reality would likely allow,” Joseph Verbovszky, one of the heads of the German Wargaming Center and part of the game’s leadership, said afterward. But measures such as declaring a state of heightened tension — and even invoking Article 42 (7) of the EU treaties — had little immediate impact on the Red Team’s behavior.

“Blue failed to do the one thing that would have forced Red to adjust its strategy: military action,” he said.

The simulation ended with many questions left unanswered. Does Russia fully hold the corridor? Does NATO eventually activate its defense plans? Can Europe act without the United States? Does the German brigade ultimately fight? Would a Russian advance succeed in reality? None of this is resolved. But that was never the point of the war game. The aim was to expose German decision-making patterns and their weaknesses — and to explore what they could mean for the alliance as a whole.

One thing, however, is clear: Deterrence does not fail at the moment of escalation. It fails long before.