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We Learned Something Fascinating About Trump’s Foreign Policy This Week

POLITICO reporters break down Trump’s escalating approach to U.S. power.

By Heidi Vogt

The U.S. attack on Venezuela was a shocking moment that reminded the world of a key fact about Trump 2.0: The administration’s foreign policy bears little resemblance to that of President Donald Trump’s first term.

This time around, it is more aggressive, more unpredictable and more willing to accept the risk of domestic and global backlash. It all points to a White House eager to rewrite the rules of U.S. power and reassert American dominance in the Western Hemisphere.

To get a better sense of how the future may unfold, we convened a roundtable with POLITICO reporters who cover the White House and Trump’s foreign policy. The discussion featured senior foreign affairs correspondent Nahal Toosi, White House and foreign affairs correspondent Eli Stokols, national security reporter Eric Bazail-Eimil, White House reporter Diana Nerozzi and magazine reporter Ian Ward.

With few details about tangible next steps provided by the Trump administration, they weighed in on a few questions: Which country could be next? Who are the people that have Trump’s ear right now? What is the endgame here?

Here’s what they shared.

This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

Our panelists

Eric Bazail-Eimil

National security reporter, POLITICO

Diana Nerozzi

White House reporter, POLITICO

Eli Stokols

White House and foreign affairs correspondent, POLITICO

Nahal Toosi

Senior foreign affairs correspondent, POLITICO

Ian Ward

Reporter, POLITICO Magazine

You all have been covering Donald Trump and his administration for some time. What has surprised each of you the most over this past week following the Venezuela operation?

Nahal, let’s start with you.

Nahal Toosi: I’ve been shocked but not surprised by many things — if there’s a word that captures that feeling, let me know. Perhaps above all, I’m startled by how blatant President Trump has been about his desire for access to Venezuela’s oil. That has overshadowed other arguments, such as the battle against drug cartels.

Eli Stokols: I know that feeling well, Nahal. And I agree: The unvarnished avarice — the drug cartels have almost vanished as a pretext for all of this, with the clear focus now on oil excavation — is striking, even for a politician who has been saying “take the oil!” for decades.

Diana Nerozzi: Trump has made countless threats against world leaders over the years, leading me to believe that perhaps the posturing towards Maduro was just that, a tactic, and that a deal would be struck at the last minute. The capture of a foreign president, the vow to take oil and the floating of being involved in the governing of another country for years to come is a definite shocking escalation of usual Trump.

Ian Ward: I’ve been surprised by Trump’s insistence, contrary to the messaging from some of his allies, that the U.S. plans to stay involved in Venezuela in some way. After the initial operation, I assumed that Trump would message it like he did the Iran strikes in June — that the U.S. got in and got out quickly — but he seems to have another plan in mind.

Eric Bazail-Eimil: I also agree with Nahal. The fixation on Venezuela’s oil is so surprising. Yes, there’s obviously this history of U.S. companies being involved in the country’s oil industry — and the lingering bitterness about the expropriation under Hugo Chavez — but at the same time, this is also a president that’s championed American energy. Certainly, it fits into the broader approach of an administration that has prioritized benefits to the U.S., but in this case, those benefits come potentially at the detriment of a major U.S. industry.

Toosi: Two more thoughts on this: I’m told by a reliable source that Trump didn’t fixate much or really at all on Venezuelan oil when he tried to oust Maduro during his first term. He really disliked Maduro, though, and was aghast at what Maduro had done to Venezuela’s economy. And as far as whether he’d capture another country’s president: Every time I thought, ‘Nah, he won’t do it,’ I remembered that he killed Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani and took out Iran’s nuclear sites.

To follow up on that, Nahal and Eric, Trump had hawks and hard-liners in his first administration, and as you say, Nahal — he himself has long been critical of Maduro. But Trump was skeptical of direct military intervention in Venezuela and the region in his first term. What has changed?

Bazail-Eimil: This is an incredibly complicated question. The Iran strikes clearly convinced the administration that the use of force can be done in ways that advance the America First ethos, without necessarily entangling the U.S. in a foreign conflict. I’d also add that there have been real shifts in the worldview around Trump. The Western Hemisphere is just so much more central to the way the administration understands American power around the world, and that focus has shown up in unexpected places. From the Pentagon to the synthesis between immigration enforcement and foreign policy, it’s all connected. And we can’t discount the influence of Marco Rubio, who’s wanted a really muscular response to Maduro for much of his career.

Toosi: Another possible factor: This is, for all intents and purposes, Trump’s last term. He doesn’t have many in his circle holding him back the way he did in his first term. And he likely just feels more free, more unleashed and more willing to make drastic moves.

Stokols: Absolutely that. Anyone with any fixed ideology is gone, and he’s intent on using raw power to get all the things he wants with the abandon of a politician who doesn’t have to run again.

At this point, do you think the odds of an intervention in Greenland have increased? If so, why?

Stokols: I wouldn’t say the odds have increased, but they certainly haven’t gone down. I think what’s increased, in Trump’s view, is his ability to scare Europe and Denmark into a negotiation they’ve long said is not on the table. After the operation in Venezuela, the messaging was very intentional to the rest of the world, saying, ‘Take us seriously when we make threats and take the deal before it gets to this.’ And he and others have intentionally mentioned Greenland in this context. He seems to be using the same approach he’s long applied with NATO/Europe, which is to begin by punching them in the face and then see if he can get them to acquiesce. The success in getting NATO to increase defense spending after his pressure campaign and threats to leave the alliance has been instructive, according to some of the Trump aides I’ve spoken to.

When asked, they won’t rule out military force, shocking as it might be to do that to a longtime NATO ally. But as they’ve said, Trump will always keep every option open because it’s smart negotiating, “The Art of the Deal.” I think, if this comes to seem more likely, there would be a lot more allies warning him against following through with an operation to seize Greenland than there were with Venezuela.

In terms of who is making moves inside the administration on Venezuela, there has been speculation about whether Stephen Miller or Marco Rubio is the prime mover behind the attack. Diana, does one or the other have the upper hand with Trump at the moment?

Nerozzi: This is definitely a moment for Rubio, who has focused on Venezuela for years, and Miller, who is Trump’s hard-line immigration enforcer, to shine. Sources tell me that both are aligned on being tough on Venezuela and were key figures in briefing Trump on options — but Rubio has been getting more public attention given his power in the administration and prospects for 2028 as a possible VP candidate.

While some speculate that one specific policymaker pushed Trump to strike, I believe the president is still in charge and was eager to send a major signal to the world and capitalize on business assets through oil. The advisers just had to not hold him back.

Bazail-Eimil: I’ll add that the ultimate indicator of who is the primary mover in this process will be whether the U.S. can secure a free, fair and democratic election in Venezuela. And whether migration cooperation with Caracas expands. Because if the first occurs, it’s a clear win for Rubio and his political base in Miami of Cuban exiles and Venezuelan immigrants and shows how the administration’s priorities unfolded. And especially if the second occurs without the first, it shows that Miller was really driving this.

There have been some notable absences, though, including Vice President JD Vance and Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard. Ian, what has their role been in this intervention? Why are they keeping out of the limelight?

Ward: Obviously, it put both of them in a difficult position, since they both built their political brands opposing just this type of intervention — in Gabbard’s case, by directly opposing intervention in Venezuela while she was in the House. They’ve both publicly come around to support the Venezuela operation, but the question to my mind is: To what degree does that represent an actual evolution of their foreign policy views, and to what degree is it just political posturing to stay in line with Trump? I think that’s not settled yet.

Vance has been very vocal about promoting the so-called Trump Doctrine — negotiate, use force to advance American interests and then get out. That helped him square the circle on the Iran operation, but it’s looking like it will be tougher for him to justify the Venezuela operation in those terms, given that the “get out” part seems very far from definite.

Toosi: So ... I don’t believe in presidential doctrines. And there are already many different people giving Trump many different doctrines. It’s mind-bending. But I have to wonder, especially for Vance, who will likely run for president, how much evolution will the MAGA base forgive? Or the America First base? They are separate now, I guess?

Ian, your recent story about the MAGA response to the Maduro operation also detailed a surprising lack of concern from the America First crowd. What do you think is the biggest reason it has been so muted?

Ward: I think a lot of America Firsters do bring a different analytical frame when evaluating actions in the Western Hemisphere. Dominating the Western Hemisphere is such a central part of even the restrainers’ vision that they have much more tolerance for intervention when it’s close to home. But obviously, there is also a political calculation here. The MAGA figures who argued against U.S. participation in the Iran strikes came out looking weak and marginal, and I think that lesson was learned this time around.

Stokols: Trump seems to be correct when he’s said — responding to the Marjorie Taylor Greene critique of too much focusing on foreign policy — that he invented MAGA and knows better than anyone what it is. MAGA is whatever he says it is. And for Vance, who may not have the force of personality to hold the coalition together once Trump is gone, it seems prudent to simply follow along with whatever Trump does. Same with a lot of the outside voices (Steve Bannon et al.) who mostly derive their power from staying aligned with the broader coalition and the White House.

Are any of the rest of you getting a sense that there are efforts to pull Trump back from “running” Venezuela?

Nerozzi: On running Venezuela, I feel like many things are still in flux. The president has had several unusual “policy planning” meetings this week on his calendar, which may be focused on Venezuela. The language about plans of running the country is not set in stone, and there could be efforts behind closed doors, but the White House is doing a lot to prevent leaks.

Stokols: The administration’s commitment to running Venezuela in actuality may not match Trump’s enthusiasm for saying that he’s running it. It’s a long way to go to be able to judge their actual level of involvement.

Diana, what are you hearing from inside the White House or those close to the administration about how Trump will now approach Venezuela and the now-acting President Delcy Rodriguez? Is there a plan, or are they making it up as they go along?

Nerozzi: From a source close to the administration, the feeling is that the White House will use Rodriguez for as long as they deem fit and will eventually look to have elections. If Rodriguez doesn’t follow along, she can be pushed aside.

We started out this conversation talking about what a unique role oil is playing in the Venezuela situation. Let’s return to that briefly.

Eric, POLITICO has reported on the reluctance of many oil executives to make major investments in Venezuela, in part because of the country’s instability and the difficulty of extracting and refining the country’s reserves. How central to Trump’s motivations is access to Venezuela’s oil?

Bazail-Eimil: Increasingly, it’s becoming a co-equal part of the calculus, along with drug trafficking. Trump recently leveled a lot of criticism of the Bush administration’s approach to the Iraq War because of the way the U.S. didn’t capitalize on the economic opportunity there. And with Venezuela, oil is an even bigger economic factor. The country is believed to have the largest oil reserves in the world (though there’s debate about how vast they actually are), and the development of the oil sector is pretty much essential for the country to stabilize and prosper. You can’t get to the day after with Venezuela without a major expansion in oil production, and U.S. major oil companies could be a big factor there.

What sort of reverberations are you seeing from Trump’s latest moves in the broader Latin American region? Is this changing the calculus for the Cuban regime? Others?

Toosi: Clearly, the Colombians are worried.

Nerozzi: The Trump administration has stressed that the fall of Venezuela will likely lead to Cuba’s demise, given their economic ties to Caracas.

Bazail-Eimil: For Cuba, it’s deprived them of a major economic partner. Cuba relied on Venezuela for oil and food products, and even though Mexico has offered Cuba more oil, that’s far from meeting the shortfall. And the Colombians, Mexicans and other left-wing governments are concerned about the precedent it’s established in terms of international law.

But I’ll also note that plenty of governments were pretty conciliatory, and it underscores how much the region has shifted right. The Caribbean islands, Argentina, El Salvador, Ecuador, Guyana were all pretty positive toward it.

Toosi: There has been, in the region, a deep frustration with the Venezuelan government and the power of the drug cartels, who traffic in way more than drugs. But ... it’s follow-through that matters. (See: Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya.)

Bazail-Eimil: Pretty much every right-wing leader in a country that absorbed heavy numbers of Venezuelan migrants praised the operation, to Nahal’s point.

Toosi: One thing that confuses me about this idea that the GOP base is all-in on dominating the Western Hemisphere is that the U.S. already, by far, was the most dominant power in the hemisphere. Yes, the Chinese and others had made some inroads, but the real problem was economics, trade, diplomacy. It wasn’t about military power. I’ve written a lot about this. If the U.S. wanted to up its game in the Western Hemisphere, it probably could have done more — and made more friends — by pursuing new trade deals.

To move back stateside, Marco Rubio’s political prospects came up earlier. Nahal, given what a major force Rubio has been on the actions in Venezuela, what do you think this operation — and how it shakes out — could mean for his political future?

Toosi: At the moment, Rubio’s star is rising on the right. There’s, once again, talk of him running for president in 2028. He has said he won’t run if Vance does, and that he would be willing to be Vance’s VP. But Rubio has changed his mind about running for office before, and so not a lot of people put much stock in that.

That said, how this operation in Venezuela and other moves on the global front go could dramatically affect Rubio’s standing over time. There are three more years left in this administration, and no one is more identified with the president’s foreign policy than Rubio, except for the president. Now, most voters don’t typically make their choice based on foreign policy, but this has, to a large degree, been a very heavy foreign-policy-focused presidency so far. That said, every single Republican running in 2028 will have to bear the fallout — or the upsides — of Trump’s decisions on both the domestic and global fronts.

Bazail-Eimil: He could also always make a Florida politics comeback! Governor in 2030. A Senate seat if Rick Scott steps aside at some point.

Ian, do you think this could be a winner for Rubio politically?

Ward: Rubio seems to have handicapped himself politically by suggesting that he will back Vance if Vance decides to run. But I do hear privately from people in Trump world that the Rubio redemption arc is real — and that was even before the Venezuela operation. So never say never, I guess.

One final question: What’s the end game here? What is Trump trying to achieve with this new approach to U.S. foreign policy?

Bazail-Eimil: Beyond all the goals of a more stable and pliant Venezuela that doesn’t produce migrants that come to the U.S. or shelter drug cartels, he’s also conveying that the world should take his threats seriously. There was a lot of talk that Trump would “chicken out” before going through with this, or take an off-ramp, or just settle for the boat strikes. Trump — in Iran, Nigeria and Venezuela — has shown that he means it when he issues threats to use the U.S. military.

Nerozzi: Trump is trying to live out his foreign policy dreams in his last administration by putting forth U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere. He’s spoken about his admiration for figures like William McKinley, who expanded U.S. territories — it would make Trump feel accomplished as a president.

Stokols: I agree with Diana. The goal appears to be nothing less than dominance of the hemisphere, and the power and riches that come with that. Stephen Miller articulated the idea pretty explicitly on CNN the other night. Trump may settle at times for leaders like Colombia’s Gustavo Petro, who made the overtures Maduro did not, such as calling, showing a public level of deference and respect and taking seriously his priorities of cracking down on drugs or whatever else that may be. He wants to convey American strength and dominance through a variety of means, including but not limited to military force. But he’s clearly intent on sending that message.

Toosi: It’s also important to remember how much Trump loves a big show, a spectacle. As he sometimes says, “This will make for great television.” The show will go on.

Ward: I’ve heard a couple of people toss around the term “propaganda through force” — in other words, using U.S. military might primarily to send a message about American strength and domination, rather than to effectuate a specific geostrategic goal. I’ll go with that.

Toosi: Isn’t that just ... force?

Ward: To quote Stephen Miller: “But we live in a world, in the real world … that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power.”

Stokols: Exactly.

Bazail-Eimil: Thucydides would be so happy with Stephen Miller.

Toosi: Oh dear.